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ACCOUNTABILITY IN
CHECHNYA-ADDRESSING INTERNAL
MATTERS WITH LEGAL AND POLITICAL
INTERNATIONAL NORMS
Welcome to Hell
—Signpost at the entrance to Grozny, Chechnya'
INTRODUCTION
Coming on the heels of recent atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda,
the tragic images of the battle for the city of Grozny appeared all too
familiar. 2
 The dead literally lined the streets as Russian troops fought
to overcome the secessionist forces of the breakaway republic of Chech-
nya. 5
 Unlike Bosnia or Rwanda, however, the international community
has consistently characterized events in Chechnya as an internal matter
of the Russian Federation. 4
 Despite expressing moral outrage at acts
such as Russia's indiscriminate bombing of civilians, foreign govern-
ments tempered their criticism by recalling that Chechnya remained
a part of the Russian Federation, and thus international norms gov-
erning inter-state conflicts did not apply.' United Nations Secretary
General Boutros-Boutros Ghali emphasized that "it is purely an inter-
1
 Michael Specter, Hundreds Killed in Chechen Strife, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1995, at 1.
2 See, e.g., Andrew jay Cohen, On the Trail of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1994, at A23
(analyzing Rwanclan atrocities and methods for holding individuals accountable); Fred Kaplan,
Despite Pledge, Chechen Capital is Bombed Again, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1994, at 10 (discussing
developments in Chechnya and role of media in publicizing it); Lucia Mouat, UN Tackles Genocide
in Europe and Africa, CHRIST/AN Set. MONITOR, Aug. 3, 1994, at 7 (discussing U.N. investigation
of war crimes and genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda).
3 Michael Specter, Russian War: Corpses and Wild Dogs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1995, at 1.
4 1n both Bosnia and Rwanda, the United Nations Security Council found a threat to
international peace and security that justified international intervention. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 770,
U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992) (in re Bosnia). With respect to Chechnya, however,
foreign governments demonstrated a general unwillingness to label that crisis an international
conflict or a threat to international peace and security. See, e.g., Patrick Bishop, West Turns Blind
Eye to Terror Tactics, DAILY 'FEL (London), Jan. 5, 1995, at 14, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Curnws File (Europe and United States quick to reinfOrce Russian claim that Checlinya is an
internal matter); George J. Church, Russia: Death Trap,Timr., Jan. 16, 1995, at 42 (U.S. and West
European governments acknowledge without question Russia's right to hold its federation to-
gether); State Department Briefing, FED. NEWS SERV., Dec. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File (U.S. State Department views Chechnya as primarily internal Russian affair).
5
 See, e.g, Delors Warns }Wain on Chechnya and Europe Ties, Reuters World Service, Jan. 14,
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nal affair. And we are not allowed to enter an internal affair ... unless
the two protagonists to the dispute agree for our intervention."6
This distinction between internal and international affairs flows
from the fundamental concept in international law of sovereign equal-
ity: i.e., all states possess plenary competence within their respective
territories.? Thus, states generally retain the freedom to act, unfettered
by other states or international organizations in areas within their
domestic jurisdiction.' In the past, this rule consistently would lead a
state to claim that issues involving its treatment of its own nationals
constituted a matter exclusively within its domestic jurisdiction.° Today,
however, the absolute nature of this rule has eroded as international
law'° now attempts to limit such plenary authority by imposing obliga-
tions on a state actor's internal conduct as a matter of international
and municipal law."
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (European Commission President Delors
finds Russian behavior in Chechnya unacceptable but notes international law does not justify
European Union intervention in what amounts to Russian internal matter); Steve Goldstein, US.
Calls Escalation a "Setback" Christopher Deplores Attack on Grainy, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 13, 1995,
at Al (U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher says United States doing everything it can to
encourage Russians to bring killing to end, but still calls it Russia's internal affair for Russians
and Chechens to work out); Taras Lairokhin, Russia's Moves in Chechnya Lawful Yet Wrong,
Denmark Says, TASS (Moscow), Dec. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File
(Danish government cites Russian use of force in Chechnya as wrong, although it finds no formal
violation of international law as of yet).
D Larry King Line: Interview with Boutros -Boutros Ghali (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 22,
1994), Transcript No. 1312 [hereinafter Ghali Interview), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
7 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 1 (United Nations "based on the principle of sovereign
equality of all its members").
8 U.N, CHARTER art. 2, 1 7 (United Nations not authorized "to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," unless applying collective security
enforcement measures); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the. United Nations, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Stipp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration
Concerning Friendly Relations] (United Nations General Assembly resolution affirming "duty not
to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State"); see also J.L. BRIERLY, THE
LAW OF NATIONS 73-75 (1963).
D See BRIERLY, supra note 8, at 291.
ID International Law may be defined as the body of rules and principles that bind states in
their relations with one another. BRIERLY, supra note 8, at 1. The sources of international law
that constrain state behavior are outlined in Article 38(1) of the International Court of Justice
Statute: (a) treaties; (b) international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law;
(c) general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and (d) as a subsidiary means,
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. See STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38, 1 1.
See, e.g., CONST. OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (DCC. 12, 1993) art. 15 ("Generally recog-
nized principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of the Russian
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Applying this framework to the Chechen context, it becomes ap-
parent that even if the international community correctly labeled the
Chechen conflict an "internal matter," a point open to debate, certain
international norms involving the jus in hello, literally the "law in war,"
continue to apply. 12 In particular, the Russian Federation has ratified
a number of treaties, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their
1977 Protocols, that establish certain sets of standards governing the
use of force in conflicts of both an international and non-international
character. 13 As a party to these treaties, Russia thus accepted, as a matter
of international and Russian law, a legal obligation to abide by their
norms in applicable situations."
Federation are a constituent part of [the Russian] legal system."); HANS KF,L,SON, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 191-202 (1959) (contending no matters exist that cannot be regulated by
international law). But see BRIERLY, supra note 8, at 292-96 (discussing practical difficulties of
using international legal norms to address a state's treatment of its own nationals).
12 The jus in hello refers to the standards of conduct applicable within an ongoing armed
conflict and should not be confused with the jus ad helium, which denotes when states may legally
resort to force. See, e.g., EDWARD KWAKWA, THE. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 3-4 (1991). For a thorough discussion of the
history and development of the jus in hello as applied to both international and internal armed
conflicts, see generally FRITS KALSHOVEN, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CON-
STRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 7-24 (1991). With respect to applying the jus ad helium to
Russian and Chechen justifications for their respective uses of force, such issues lie outside of the
scope of this Note and must be reserved for further study. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963) (providing detailed discussion of the jus
ad helium's history and development).
13
 See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
tion 1]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention 11]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV] [collectively referred to hereinafter as "Geneva Conventions"]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I,
II, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) thereinafter Protocol 1]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Inter-
national Armed Conflicts (Protocol I1), Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annexes I, II, 1977,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol 11]; see also 15 HUM. R'rs. L.J. 56, 62-63
(1994) (listing Russian ratifications to Geneva Conventions and both Protocols). Although cus-
tomary international law also could constrain Russian conduct, the scope of this Note does not
permit an inquiry into the applicability of such norms to Chechnya and must be reserved for
future study.
14 See STATUTE OF 'THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, art. 38, 111(a)
(listing treaties as a basic source of international law); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 22, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, art. 26 ("pacta stint servanda—every treaty in fOrce is
binding upon the parties to it and must he perfbrmed by them in good faith"); see also CONST,
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More difficult issues arise, however, when one shifts the focus from
asking whether international law should apply to events in Chechnya
to asking who has authority to determine which laws apply, and how to
hold the parties accountable for any violations.' 5 In an arguably intra-
state conflict such as the one in Chechnya, little likelihood exists that
a state could bring a claim against either of the warring parties before
an adjudicatory body such as the International Court of Justice (the
"ICJ").' 6 With respect to issues of responsibility, the prospect of an
internal investigation by the current Russian government raises serious
questions of credibility, given its direct involvement in the fighting. 17
Russia also possesses the United Nations Security Council (the "Secu-
rity Council") veto power necessary to obstruct any United Nations
attempt to erect either an international fact-finding body or a war
crimes tribunal such as those created to hold individuals accountable
for atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda.' 8
OF THE RUSSIAN FF.mouvriost, supra note 11, an 15 (incorporating international treaties into
Russian legal system: "[Wan international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes rules other
than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty apply").
15 See, e.g., Alfred P. Rubin, Enforcing the Rules of International Law, 34 HARV.	 L.J. 149,
158 (1993) (international legal order unable to discipline a state that refuses to enforce its
obligation to punish war criminals within its jurisdiction).
16 The ICJ functions as the principal judicial organ for the United Nations and its member
states. See. U.N. CHARTER art. 92. Among the several problems facing any state trying to bring a
claim before the ICJ in an intrastate conflict such as the one in Chechnya, the requirement of
standing (i.e., applicants must show the Court that they possess a sufficient legal interest in the
case) looms large. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., Second Phase,
(Beig. v. Spain), 1970 3 (holding that Belgium lacked standing to bring claim on behalf of
Belgian shareholders in Canadian corporation that suffered injury as result of Spanish action).
Any state claiming violations of the /us in bello in Chechnya would thus need to show not only
evidence of violations, but also the grounds on which it had standing to bring these alleged
violations before the ICJ, a difficult assertion given that states universally characterized events in
Chechnya from the start as an internal Russian matter. For further discussion of the difficulties
in enforcing international law in internal conflicts, see infra notes 257-69, and accompanying
text.
17 To date, Russian authorities have shown only nominal interest in accusations of atrocities
by their own forces, focusing instead on pursuing charges of "treason" against Chechen seces-
sionists. See, e.g., Chechen Leader Faces Russian Treason Charge, WASH. Pos-r, Feb. 2, 1995, at A24.
18 'Fhe Security Council established both the Commission of Experts and the ad hoc Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal to investigate genocide and war crimes in Bosnia and Rwanda. See, e.g.,
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. 5/25704 (1993) (establishing tribunal to prosecute viola-
tions of international humanitarian law in former Yugoslavia); M. Cherif Bassiouni, U.N. Com-
mission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, 88 Ant. J. INTI. L.
784-805 (1994) (describing findings of Commission of Experts in former Yugoslavia). Moreover,
despite the important precedent these bodies established with respect to creating international
forums to address violations of international norms, these ad hoc organs continue to face
numerous structural and procedural difficulties in practice. See, e.g., Andrew Jay Cohen, On •the
of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1994, at A23; Stephanie Grant, Yugoslavia-Human Rights:
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Given this difficulty in implementing legally binding international
rules of conduct, must one therefore conclude that all international
standards lack authority to constrict state behavior in civil conflicts like
that in Chechnya? 19
 The recent application of the politically binding
international norms of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe ("the OSCE") in Chechnya suggest otherwise." Although
not legally bound by international law, the Russian Federation recog-
nized the applicability of OSCE principles to its conduct in the war in
Chechnya. 21
 More significantly, it also agreed to permit the OSCE's
political mechanisms, which seek to ensure implementation of OSCE
norms, a role in resolving the conflict. 22
This Note examines the applicability of both legal and political
international norms to the civil conflict in Chechnya and argues that,
to the extent each set of norms establishes similar moral principles,
the political OSCE model currently appears better suited to address
violations of such principles in the intrastate context." Both OSCE
War Crimes Court Faces Many Dilemmas, Inter-Press Service, Nov, 8, 1994, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Curnws File.
19 This is not to suggest, as Kelson did, that where no specifically identified sanctions flow
front a violation (i.e., for Kelson, war and reprisals), no "law" exists. See HANS KELSON, THE PURE
THEORY OF LAW 320 (1967); Rubin supra note 15, at 159 n.19. Simply because the jus in bells
fails to identify a universal authority to enforce compliance does not relieve the international
rules of their normative value, nor does it necessarily mean that enforcement cannot occur in
other contexts (i.e., states remain free to apply moral or political sanctions when they determine
another state has violated international norms). See Rubin, supra note 15, at 159. Rather, the
question is asked to suggest that where international legal norms lack positive law enforcement
mechanisms, other international norms (i.e., moral or political ones), which include forums or
mechanisms for enforcement, may serve as an effective complement in constraining state behav-
ior to an agreed-upon set of rules.
2" See, e.g., William Drozdiak, Russia Gives U.S. Pledges on Chechnya Aid, Voting, WASH. Pose,
jam 19, 1995, at A15 (Russia agrees to cooperate with OSCE's peace mission to Chechnya);
Goldstein, supra note 5, at Al (Russian delegate to OSCE joined in unanimous vote condemning
Russian violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Chechnya while also
recognizing importance of maintaining Russia's territorial integrity); Norman Kempster, U.S.
Finds Ways to Criticize Russian Acts in Chechnya, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1995, at A9 (U.S. accuses
Russia of violating standards it accepted as part of OSCE process).
st OSCE Chairman
-in-Office on Gyarmati's Moscow Mission, mi.] Econews (Hungary), Jan.
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (Russian leaders agree that settlement of
Chechen crisis should be carried out in conformity with basic principles of OSCE).
22
 See OSCE Delegation to Visit Chechnya within Days, Reuters World Service, Jan. 18, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (OSCE mission to travel to Chechnya to examine
observation of OSCE agreements there, especially on human rights); see also Chrystia Freeland
and John Thornhill, Russia to Allow Human Rights Team in Chechnya, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan.
11, 1995, at 22 (Russia agrees to allow OSCE mission to assess human rights violations and
humanitarian needs in Chechnya in move away from Russia's insistence that crisis is internal
matter).
23 See infra notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
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norms and international law attempt to affix international standards
onto a state's internal behavior. The OSCE model, however, possesses
both a forum and several mechanisms for encouraging the implemen-
tation of these norms—tools that are conspicuously absent in the
context of international law. 24 Thus, this Note concludes that so long
as states continue to face obstacles in applying international legal
standards to civil wars, the OSCE provides a supplementary method
for establishing more effective standards to govern internal conflicts
like the one in Chechnya. Section I of this Note reviews the roots of
the Chechen conflict, the methods used by the warring factions, and
the international reaction to the conflict. 25 Section II examines the
status of the Chechen conflict under international law, the standards
that exist to constrain the methods of warfare used there, and the
mechanisms available to interpret and enforce these standards." Sec-
tion III investigates the status of OSCE norms under international law,
the applicability of relevant OSCE norms to the facts of the Chechen
conflict, and the moral and political enforcement mechanisms pro-
vided by the OSCE process to address the implementation of its
norms. 27 Finally, Section IV compares the efficacy of these legal and
political normative models in addressing the methods by which parties
use force in internal armed conflicts. 28
I. THE CHECHEN CONFLICT
A. Background
Chechnya lies in the Northern Caucasus region of the Russian
Federation, with a mostly Muslim population of approximately 1.2
million:29 Historically, Chechens regard their northern Russian neigh-
bors with suspicion and hostility." Russia's initial attempts to colonize
the wide strip of territory between itself and newly acquired Georgia
in the early nineteenth century sparked a conflict with the inde-
24 See infra notes 257-69 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 29-118 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 119-272 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 273-331 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 532-43 and accompanying text.
25 Steven Erlanger, Get Back on Track, U.S. Tells Moscow; Grozny Resists Fierce Assault by
Russian Forces, INT1 HERALD 'Thin., Jan. 16, 1995, available in LEX1S, World Library, Curnws
File.
3° Rebel Chechnya—A Thorn in Russia's Flesh, Reuters World Service, Dec. 1, 1994, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
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pendent Chechen tribes already residing there.' The ensuing war
lasted more than forty-seven years, from 1817 until 1864, when czarist
forces finally brought Chechnya into the Russian empire."
Under the Soviet regime, the Chechens fared little better, suffer-
ing official persecution for their clan systems and Islamic religion."
Thus, when German troops reached Grozny in 1943, Chechen separa-
tists launched an unsuccessful rebellion against Stalin.m In response,
in 1944 Stalin deported more than half the Chechen population to
Siberia and Kazakhstan." Approximately 200,000 people perished dur-
ing these years of exile, which lasted until 1957. 3" History seemed to
repeat itself in 1991, when conservative Communist Party officials
launched an abortive coup against the Soviet government, and the
leaders of the Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic rushed to sup-
port it." A temporary council, with Russian Federation President Boris
Yeltsin's tacit approval, subsequently replaced the discredited Chechen
leadership."
B. The Road to War
In September of 1991, the return to Chechnya of Dzhokhar
Dudayev, a former Soviet general, to lead the popular "National Pa-
triot" party paved the way for the current conflict." As the Soviet Union
began to split apart, Dudayev led a coup in October 1991 under the
banner of independence from Russia, to which the Chechen republic
technically still belonged under the Soviet Constitution." After taking
over the Chechen KGB headquarters, the Interior Ministry, the airport
"
32 Specter, supra note 3, at 1. Sortie 400,000 Chechens died during that conflict. See Richard
Lyons, Explosive Mix in Chechnya: History, Hatred and Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1994, at A14.
33 Rebel Chechnya—A Thorn in Russia's Flesh, supra note 30.
34 Id.
33 Inga Saffron, Gangster Style Reigns in Breakaway State—Lawlessness a Matter of National
hide in Chechnya, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 30, 1994, at A35.
1" Rebel Chechnya—A Thorn in Russia's Flesh, supra note 30.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.; Chronology of Russian-Chechen Crisis, Reuters World Service, Feb. 16, 1995, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
in Vladimir Yemelyanenko, Russia-Chechnya: A Forced Love Affair, Moscow News, Nov. 18,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, A]lwld File. Accounts on the level of violence used in
overthrowing the temporary council government vary. Compare Rebel Chechnya—A Thorn in
Russia's Flesh, supra note 30 (characterizing Dudayev's October 1991 revolt as a "bloody mutiny")
with Yemelyanenko, supra (characterizing coup as only bloodless revolution in Caucasus after
collapse of Soviet. Union).
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and the parliament, Dudayev went on to hold and win Chechnya's first
presidential election.' "President" Dudayev then officially declared
Chechnya's independence from Russia. 42
Russian President Boris Yeltsin refused to recognize the Chechen
secession, declaring it illegal and instituting a state of emergency,
which the new Chechen Parliament promptly refused to enforce. 43 In
November of 1991, Yeltsin sent 650 troops to Grozny, the Chechen
capital, to reimpose Russian rule." When Chechen fighters blocked
the airport and prevented Russian troops from reaching Grozny, how-
ever, Russian forces withdrew outside of Chechnya's borders:45 Given
all the other problems associated with the Soviet Union's dissolution,
the Russian Federation could do little in the next three years to enforce
directly its sovereignty, contenting itself with economic, transport and
diplomatic blockades of the tiny republic. 46 Nevertheless, Moscow con-
tinued to take Chechnya's defiance seriously, not only because of
economic concerns—Russia stood to lose access to both its oil pipeline
(a part of which runs through Chechnya) and the republic's own oil
resources—but also because of the dangerous precedent a successful
Chechen secession would set for Russia's authority over other ethnic
groups and regions. 47
For its part, Chechnya continued to insist upon its independence
from Moscow, including its refusal to sign the 1992 Federation Treaty,
41 Compare Yemelyanenko, supra note 40 (asserting election results "inevitable") with Church,
supra note 4, at 42 (describing elections as "crooked").
Alessandra Stanley, Russia Backs Group Fighting Secession in South, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1994,
at A9.
43 Jeff Berliner, Breakaway Chechen Republic Wracked by Protests in Southern Russia, UPI, Apr.
I, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Ailwld File.
" Rebel Chechnya—A Thorn in Russia's Flesh, supra note 30.
46 Id.; see also Berliner, supra note 43; Stanley, supra note 42, at 9.
46 See Press Briefing by Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, Official Kremlin ln el News Broad-
cast, Oct. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (Foreign Ministry refuses to
discuss Chechnya because Foreign Ministry does not comment on internal political developments
inside Russian Federation); see also Anne Carrels, All Things Considered: Moscow Denies Involve-
ment in War in Chechnya (NPR radio broadcast, Nov. 29, 1994), Transcript No. 1681-9, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File; Alessandra Stanley, Russian Troops on Full Alert in the
Caucasus, N.Y. Timm, Sept. 6, 1994, at A9; Yemelyanenko, supra note 40. Although it appears
Russia and Chechnya tried several times to resolve their differences diplomatically, these efforts
were of no avail. See Sharip Asuyev, Results of Talks Between Russia and Chechnya in Grozny, TASS,
Jan. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (Chechen and Russian representatives
recognize "vital necessity and possibility of settling bilateral relations by exclusively peaceful,
political means"); Chechen Presidential Advisor Arrives in Moscow, BBC Summary of World Broad-
casts, Sept. 19, 1994, from Interfax, Sept. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File
(Dudayev's advisor in Moscow for talks, the existence of which Russian Foreign Ministry denies).
47 See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 32, at 14; Michael Specter, Russian Forces Move Into Rebel Region,
N.Y. TIMF„S, Dec. 12, 1994, at 1. The Russian Interior Minister Viktor Yerin later commented in
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which laid out the distribution of authority between the Russian Fed-
eral Government and its constituent parts." Meanwhile, the economic
and diplomatic isolation—no country ever formally recognized Chech-
nya's independence— took its toll in Chechnya as increasing internal
opposition emerged to challenge Dudayev personally:" On August 2,
1994, the opposition group "Provisional Council" announced its inten-
tion to overthrow Dudayev and normalize relations with Moscow.'' This
emerging internal conflict within Chechnya led Russia to back away
from asserting an interest in direct intervention in Chechen affairs.
Instead, it focused efforts on supporting the internal opposition to
Dudayev with money and weapons.52 Publicly, Russia also cited the
escalating violence and state of lawlessness in Chechnya to explain its
increase in troop deployments to the Chechen border."
response to domestic criticism of the Russian intervention in Chechityat "What our not so
far-sighted politicians are forgetting is that the success of this operation—and we are confident
that it will be successful—will give assurance to many other regions of Russia that we shall not let
them get into the state in which Chechnya has found itself." Russia: Grachev, Yerin and Stepashin
Hold Press Conference in Mozdok, BBC Monitoring Service, Dec. 31, 1994, from Ostankino Channel
1, Dec. 29, 1994 (text of press report), available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
45 Gcnnady M. Dan ilenko, The New Russian Federalism, 1 NEW EURO. L. REv. 367, 380 (1993),
Tatarstan also refused to sign the treaty, but has since negotiated a separate agreement with
Russia, acknowledging its membership in the Russian Federation while retaining a certain level
of autonomy. See id. at 382; Shaliga Tatarstan's Separate Peace, CtIRISTIAN Set. Motirrou,
Dec. 23, 1994, at 18.
Yemelyanenko, supra note 40 (rioting Saudi Arabia and Kuwait offered to establish diplo-
matic relations with Muslim Chechnya, but Dudayev turned down offers, insisting Russia must
recognize Chechnya first),
5° See, e.g., Berliner; supra note 43 (describing seizure of radio and television station in
protests against Dudayev in April 1992 that led to death of at least five people); Yernelyamniko,
supra note 40 (finding that some Chechens oppose Dudayev personally, but none support
reestablishing federal relations with Russia).
91
 Key Events Leading to Chechen Showdown, Agence France Presse, Nov. 26, 1994, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File. The situation became further complicated when several
days later, on August 8, Khasbulatov, the former Russian Supreme Soviet Speaker who organized
the 1993 uprising against Yeltsin, returned to Chechnya to lead an anti-Dudayev movement. Id.
By September 1994, the various opposition groups announced that they stood united in their aim
to overthrow Dudayev by force. Id.
92 See Chechnya; Russia Will Not Send Troops to Chechnya, Minister Tells Chechen Delegation,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws
File (Russian Minister of Nationalities and Deputy Prime Minister both insist Russia will not
intervene directly in Chechen crisis); see also Rebel Chechitya—A Thorn in Russia's Flesh, supra
note 30 (Russia made no secret of its backing anti -Dudayev Provisional Council); Sebastian Smith,
Moscow's Hidden Hand Gives Chechen President Hard Shove, Agence France Presse, Nov. 26, 1994,
available in LE.XIS, World Library, Curnws File (Moscow crippled Chechnya with economic
blockade while supplying federal funds to Provisional Council); Stanley, Russia Backs Group
Fighting Secession, supra note 42, at A9 (Russian government openly hacked opposition move-
ment).
93 Lawrence Sheets, Tiny Chechnya Spits Defiance at "Lying" Russia, Reuters World Service,
Dec. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File. A powerful Chechen tnafia now
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On October 21, 1994, the Chechen opposition officially asked
President Yeltsin for assistance because of the consistent string of
defeats suffered by their forces." Although Russia denied providing
anything more than moral and financial support, Dudayev and his
government accused Russia of conducting an undeclared war, using
Russian troops and equipment in Chechnya." Fighting escalated in
November 1994 when opposition forces, including some forty helicop-
ter gunships bearing Russian markings, unsuccessfully attempted to
capture Dudayev's government positions near Grozny. 56 The crisis
came to a head when Dudayev claimed that Chechen fighters captured
seventy Russian soldiers in the failed attack, and then threatened to
execute them as "mercenaries" unless Russia took responsibility for its
participation in the hostilities. 57 If Russia did admit it sent the soldiers,
however, Dudayev insisted that he would treat them "in conformity with
the Constitution of Chechnya and international law."58
Although Russia eventually admitted its forces participated in the
failed attack," President Yeltsin took the opportunity to shift tactics,
giving both sides (the opposition and Dudayev) two days to disarm
their forces or face the introduction of a state of emergency and the
possible arrival of Russian troops." Talks to defuse the conflict broke
operates throughout post-Soviet Russia, which has led to Russian stereotypes of Chechens as
criminals, thugs and terrorists. See Saffron, supra note 35, at A35; Yemelyanenko, supra note 40.
The Russian government relied on these images along with the increasing rate of hijackings and
terrorist activities in the Caucasus region to build its case against a separate Chechnya. See Arkady
Popov, The Threat of Chechnya, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Curnws File; Press Conference with the Chairman of the Chechen Parliament, Official Kremlin Int'l
News Broadcast, Nov. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (discussing Russian
prejudice against Chechens).
54 See Key Events Leading to Chechen Showdown, supra note 51.
55 See Press Conference with the Chairman of the Chechen Parliament, supra note 53 (Chechen
leader accuses Russians of having sent troops to .Chechnya and conducting an undeclared war
against it); see also Carrels, supra note 46 (Russia denies any involvement in Chechen civil unrest);
Smith, supra note 52 (Dudayev accuses Russia of sending soldiers and special services to over-
throw him).
5" See Key Events Leading to Chechen Showdown, supra note 51; Rebel Chechnya—A Thorn in
Russia's Flesh, supra note 30.
57 Lawrence Sheets, Chechnya Hints it May Execute "Russian Mercenaries", Reuters World
Service, Nov. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (quoting Dudayev—"if
Russia does not recognize these soldiers as prisoners of war they will be tried by the laws of shariat
(Islamic rule)").
58 Chechnya—Duma Delegation Ends Chechnya Visit-2 POWs Released, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Dec. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (quoting
Dudayev).
59 See Specter, Russian Forces Move into Rebel Region, supra note 47, at Al.
f't) See Rebel Chechnya—A Thorn in Russia's Flesh, supra note 30; see also Michael Specter,
Yeltsin Threatens- Action on Warring Secessionist Area, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1994, at AS (Yeltsin
emphasizes that "Chechnya is a republic within the Russian Federation . . . we have no moral
right to stand aside and watch this bloodshed").
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down when Russia issued new demands that Chechnya also embrace
the federal system it had rejected three years earlier."' Finally, on
December 11, 1994, President Yeltsin formally announced that he had
ordered Russian troops to move into the Chechen republic to protect
both Russia's territorial integrity and its citizens' safety in Chechnya. 62
Yeltsin noted that the action would conform to the constitution and
laws of the Russian Federation, emphasizing his orders that "all officials
charged with the responsibility of restoring constitutional order in the
Chechen republic not . . . use violence against civilians [but] . . . take
them under protection.""'
Full-scale war erupted soon thereafter, as hundreds of Russian
tanks rolled into Chechnya. 64 Russian warplanes began bombing
Grozny and surrounding villages, while tens of thousands of fresh
Russian recruits confronted fierce Chechen resistance in their advance
into Chechnya.65
 Dudayev reacted by putting out a general call to
arrns. 66 Thousands of Chechen volunteers responded, pouring into the
city from the countryside, centering their defense on the symbolic
presidential palace in northern Grozny."7
In the weeks that followed, Russian planes and artillery heavily
shelled Grozny and other Chechen cities, punishing not only the
secessionist fighters but also the many civilian residents."8 Russian
bombers, ordered to target strategic sites such as Grozny's television
tower, rail terminal, presidential palace and military installations, in-
stead struck residential buildings, the main hospital, and even an
orphanage.6° Tens of thousands of civilians died as a result. 7° Outside
fii Sheets, supra note 53.
E Text of Yeltsin's Address on Chechnya, Reuters World Service, Dec, 11, 1994 (translation by
TASS News Agency), available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
63 Id.
64 Specter, supra note 47, at 1.
65 See Steven Erlanger, Troops Clash in Chechnya as Peace Efforts Falter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec, l9,
1994, at. Al.
"Thidayen—No Mow Playing Peacemakers, POWs to be Dealt with by War Laws, BBC Monitor-
ing Service, Dec. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (Dudayev insisted
supporters have "no alternative but to defend themselves against Russian troops").
° Michael Specter, Russian Troops and Secessionists.
 Battle Fiercely, N.Y. TrmEs, Jan, 2, 1995,
at 1
66 See, e.g., Michael Specter, Russians Bombard Chechen Capital from Land and Air, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1994, at Al.
69 See, e.g., Chechens Suffer Under Continued Russian Assault, (CNN television broadcast, Jan.
16, 1995) , Transcript No. 755-1, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File; Michael Gordon,
US Warns Russia: Stop Attaching Chechen Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1994, at Al2; Bruce W.
Nelan, Why it All Went So Very Wrong; TIME, Jan. 16, 1995, at 50-51; Specter, supra note 1, at Al
(describing shelling of Crozny's main hospital).
7° See Nelan, supra note 69, at 50-51. In figures released by the Russian Federation's litunan
Rights Commissioner, Sergei Kovalyuv, an estimated 24,400 civilians died in the fighting in
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Grozny, Russian planes used similar tactics, strafing and bombing the
main highway filled with fleeing refugees as well as attacking open air
markets in the cities of Augun, Shall and Chechen Aut.?'
Domestic and international opposition to the bombings escalated
as the number of civilian casualties increased2 2 Twice Yeltsin promised
to halt or avoid bombing civilians, and both times bombardments
resumed within hours after his pronouncements." Later, Russian Se-
curity Council Secretary Oieg Lobov clarified the orders, noting that
President Yeltsin had only ordered an end to aerial bombardments,
not artillery shelling. 74 Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev pub-
licly insisted that Russia's use of force to restore law and order in
Chechnya met Russia's international legal obligations." As for the
Chechens, their conduct also harmed the civilian population because
they relied on civilians and civilian shelters to shield themselves from
Russian attacks." In addition, Chechens held captured Russian soldiers
inside the Chechen Presidential Palace while Russian forces attacked."
Chechnya between November 25, 1994, and January 25, 1995, including 3,700 children under
the age of 15. Telephone Interview with Eric Engleman, Moscow Correspondent, Monitor Radio
(Feb. 22, 1995).
71 See, e.g., Specter, supra note 3, at Al; Erlanger, supra note 29.
72 See, e.g., Alessandra Stanley, Russians Say Rebel Center is Encircled; Protests Rise, N.Y. TimEs,
Dec. 24, 1995, at 4 (Lower House of Russian Parliament voted overwhelmingly to appeal to Yeltsin
to order a halt to fighting and to resume talks with Chechen leaders); Alessandra Stanley, Russian
General Halts His Tanks As Qualms over Rebellion Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1994, at 1 (Maj. Gen.
Bahichev halted his advance and told weeping Chechen women it is forbidden to use the army
against peaceful civilians. It is forbidden to shoot at the people"). For a general discussion of the
international reaction to events in Chechnya, see infra notes 84-118, and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 2, at 10 (relating to Yeltsin's December 27 promise to avoid
bombing civilians); Alessandra Stanley, Yeltsin Orders End to Bombing of Rebel City, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1995, at Al (relating to Yeltsin's second announced order to halt bombing of Grozny).
74 Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov Interviewed on Chechnya, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Jan. 16, 1995 from Russia TV Channel, Jan. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Curnws File.
75 See Kozyrev Defends Legality of Chechen Action Under International Law, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Dec. 14, 1994, from I nterf itx, Dec. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Curnws File.
76 See Human Rights Body Rebukes Both Sides in Chechnya, Reuters World Service, Jan. 19,
1995, available in, LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (concluding that Chechens stored ammu-
nition in civilian centers, including an apartment building housing civilians that exploded when
fired upon, as well as finding evidence that Chechen forces occasionally shot and killed civilians
without taking time to identify them as non-combatants). Russian military leaders made more
specific accusations, charging Checheits with using "women, children and old people as human
shields, especially when they have to break out of an encirclement." Press Conference with Head
of Public Relations for the FSIC Alexander Mikhailov and Head of Public Relations for the Interior
Ministry, Vladimir Vorozhtsov, Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast, Jan. 11, 1995, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (comments of Mikhailov).
77 See Alessandra Stanley, Chechen Palace, Symbol to Rebels, Falls to Russians, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 1995, at Al (describing Chechen evacuation of Russian prisoners from Presidential Palace
when they left that building to Russian forces),
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When Russian forces finally moved into the city of Grozny, tanks
and infantry forces sprayed mortar and rocket fire at the remaining
buildings and, occasionally, at the civilians themselves.'' After more
than five weeks of relentless bombing, shelling and rocket attacks,
Russian troops finally smashed the symbol of Chechen resistance by
capturing the Presidential Palace, prompting Yeltsin to announce that
the military stage of the conflict had ended." The announcement
proved premature, however, as it took another three weeks of intense
fighting before Russian troops finally forced Chechen secessionists to
withdraw from Grozny. 8" The Chechens, moreover, vowed to continue
their struggle, taking to the hills and villages south of Grozny. 8 ' Sub-
sequent attempts to reach a permanent cease-fire agreement failed,
leaving little room for a political solution to the crisis." Russian forces
continued to bomb and shell villages suspected of sheltering Chechen
fighters, while Chechen forces employed guerrilla tactics, including
snipers and nighttime hit-and-run attacks, to harass Russian positions."
C. International Reaction to the Chechen Conflict
Throughout the Chechen crisis, the international community con-
sistently regarded Chechnya as an internal Russian matter, emphasiz-
ing Russia's legitimate interest in maintaining the security of its bor-
ders." Still, as the number of civilian deaths became known, few states
endorsed the means the Russian government adopted to enforce its
territorial integrity. 85 In particular, Western nations expressed deep
78 See Fred Hiatt, Moscow Warns West on Criticism over Chechnya, WASH. PosT, Jan. 13, 1995,
at A26 (Human Rights Watch report concluded Russians demonstrated consistent pattern of
Firing on civilians).
7`1
	 supra note 77, at Al.
Khalid Askerov, Chechens Decide to Pull Military HQ from Gmzny, Reuters World Service,
Feb. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
81 Steven Erlanger, A Famous Victory, N.Y. Timm, Feb. 10, 1995, at A8.
82 See, e.g., Chronology of Russian -Chechen Crisis, supra note 39 (shaky 48 hour cease-fire
declared Feb. 13, 1995).
88 See Erlanger, A Famous Victory, supra note 81; Steven Erlanger, Yeltsin to Allow a European
Rights Mission in Chechnya, N.Y. Timm, Mar. 10, 1995, at A10.
84 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text; see also Tony Barber, Russia: Muslims Angered
by Moscow's Attack, THE INHEpENDEN•, Dec. 21, 1994, at 7, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Curnws File (Muslim nations such as Turkey and Iran express concern with violence in Chechnya,
rioting overriding principle of territorial integrity); Gordon, supra note fi9, at 12 (United Slates
recognizes Chechnya as Russian internal affair despite United Slates concern with civilian casu-
alties); Alessandra Stanley, Bombing of Rebel City Lets Up, But not Attacks' on Yeltsin, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 1995, at Al (German Chancellor Helmut Kohl expresses concern with Russian behavior
in Chechnya but continues to recognize it as internal Russian matter).
85 See, e.g., Jane Perlez, East Europeans Reacting Nervously to Russian Fighting, N.Y. Timm,
Jars. 5, 1995, at A9 (Polish President Lech Walesa accuses Russia of overstepping the bounds of
legitimately defending the state in its actions in Chechnya); Craig R. Whitney, Europeans Offer to
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concern when bombardments of Chechen cities apparently continued
the day after President Yeltsin had promised to halt air raids that could
harm civilians. 86 The United States specifically reminded Russia of its
international legal obligations toward civilians under the Geneva Con-
ventions.87
As the fighting in Chechnya escalated, so did criticism of Russian
methods used there. The European Commission in Brussels an-
nounced it would delay an interim trade treaty signed with Russia in
December as a way of emphasizing Europe's concern with the killing
of civilians." France warned that Moscow's actions weakened its
chances of joining the Council of Europe." As for the Muslim nations,
the fifty-one states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference called
on Moscow to end its attack on Chechnya and accused it of breaking
international law by indiscriminately using force against its own civil-
ians.9" The international organization Human Rights Watch reported
that both Russian and Chechen forces had gravely violated a number
of humanitarian laws and called on Russian authorities to punish
publicly those responsible. 9 ' In particular, the group concluded that
Russian intervention in Chechnya involved a "consistent pattern of
bombing, shelling and firing on civilians grossly violat[ing] its humani-
tarian legal obligations."92
The public condemnation of Russian, and to a lesser extent
Chechen, actions in Chechnya did not, however, do much to weaken
Help Russians Seek Peace in Secessionist War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1995, at Afi (Sweden, Denmark
and Norway criticize Russia's handling of Chechen affair).
e6 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 69, at 12 (United States State Department deeply disturbed
by bombing of Grozny less than 24 hours after Yeltsin ordered an end to air strikes that could
lead to civilian fatalities); Alessandra Stanley, Russia Delivers Mixed Signals on its Military Cam-
paign, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1994, at Al2 (French Foreign Minister accuses Yeltsin of breaking his
promise to halt air raids).
"Gordon, supra note 69, at 12. A later U.S. government study reiterated this concern,
accusing Russia of violating international agreements by attacking civilians during its invasion of
Chechnya. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Human Rights Study Turns Heat on Russia, INT'l, HERALD
Thin., Feb. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
88 Stanley, supra note 84, at I; see also EU Freezes Economic Accord with Russia over Chechnya,
Agence France Presse, Jan. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
89 Ramesh Jaura, Europe-Russia: Bonn, Paris Urge Yeltsin to End Chechnya War, Inter Presse
Service, Jan. 9, 1995, available in LEX1S, World Library, Curnws File.
9° See Nicholas Doughty, West Fuels Moslem Ire Over Chechnya, Reuters World Service, Jan. 10,
1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
91 Human Rights Body Rebukes Both Sides in Chechnya, supra note 76.
92 Id. Russian forces also were accused of severely mistreating captured Chechen fighters and
civilians. See, e.g., supra note 83 (Amnesty International alleges Russian mistreatment of Chechen
prisoners); Steve Levine, Russians Accused of Atrocities Chechzns Charge Troops Beat, Kill Civilian
Prisoners, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1995, at Al (accuses Russians of shooting, suffocating and beating
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Russia's legally recognized claim to a right to enforce its territorial
integrity." Most states recognized that without direct involvement by
the United Nations Security Council, no opportunity existed for the
international community to intervene directly to ensure Russia's inter-
nal compliance with its international legal obligations." Without the
means for enforcing international law in Chechnya, states eventually
turned to a political body—the Organization of Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, formerly referred to as the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (the "CSCE") 96—as a means of addressing the
hostilities in Chechnya in a united manner. 96
Western nations, including Germany, France and the United
States, all pointed out that in the week before ordering troops into
Chechnya, President Yeltsin agreed at the CSCE meeting in Budapest
to commit Russia to the principle that "if recourse to force cannot be
avoided in performing internal security missions, each participating
state will ensure that its use must be commensurate with the needs for
enforcement . . . the armed forces will take due care to avoid injury to
captured Chechen civilians); Russian Forces Violating Rights in Chechnya—Report, Reuters World
Service, Feb. 27, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (Human Rights Watch-10
day Field investigation concludes "undisciplined Russian soldiers attack civilians, systematically
loot civilian property and rob individual civilians"). Russian forces further blocked attempts by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (the "ICRC") to visit detainees or obtain a list of
those held prisoner. Id.
a See, e.g., Barber, supra note 89 (Muslim nations recognize potential effect of ignoring
principle of territorial integrity in Chechnya and having that stance used against themselves in
future); Gordon, supra note 69, at 12 (despite tragic treatment of civilians, United States contin-
ues to recognize Chechnya as Russian internal affair).
94
 Outside of cases involving a Security Council enforcement action, the United Nations
Charter does not authorize states to "intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 7; see also Ghali Interview, supra note
6 (comments of United Nations' Boutros-Boutros Ghali concluding United Nations can do
nothing to constrain methods used in fighting in Chechnya).
95
 Born out of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held
in Helsinki in 1975, the CSCE served as a common meeting ground for all European nations as
well as the United Stales and Canada (including NATO, Warsaw Pact, and non-aligned states).
See, e.g., ARM BLOM, Introduction to FROM HELSINKI TO VIENNA: BASIC DOCUMENTS OF" THE
HELSINKI PROCESS 1, 2-5 (1990); Harold S. Russell, The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or
Lilliput, 70 AM. J. INT'l. L. 242 (1976). Based on 10 basic principles guiding relations between
states, the OSCE developed into an organization where member states sought to reach agreement
on principles and standards of conduct that each state then agreed to implement not only
between itself and other states, but often also with respect to its own territory. See Blued, supra,
at 5-6; Human Rights—The Helsinki Process, 84 AM. Soc'y INTEL & Comp. L. 113, 122-23 (1990)
(comments of former U.S, Ambassador to CSCE John Maresca). The actual agreements of the
OSCE relevant to the Chechen conflict as well as their status as international political (but not
legal) obligations are discussed below. See infra Section Ill and accompanying text.
w See Nicholas Doughty, European Security Body Faces Test Over Chechnya, Reuters World
Service, Jan. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File; Foreign Ministers Await
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civilians or their property."97 The OSCE Member states intended this
politically binding "Code of Conduct" to mark a major change in the
way states conducted military activities." OSCE member states alleged
that the Russian use of force in Chechnya clearly violated this political
commitment."
Given such apparent violations, member states demanded that
Russia adhere to its OSCE obligations and allow an OSCE mission to
travel to Chechnya to observe the level of commitment to the organi-
zation's agreements.'°° The OSCE Parliamentary Chair Willy Wimmer
further urged Russia to "stop fighting a war against its own peopicioi
Despite continuing to assert that Chechnya remained an internal affair,
Russia eventually agreed in principle to an OSCE role in monitoring
the conflict.' 02 A January 9, 1995, meeting between Russian Minister of
Justice Valentin Kovalyov and OSCE representative Istavan Gyarmati
ironed out the OSCE role: both sides agreed on the need to enforce
the observation of international standards, while also recognizing that
separatism could not be allowed to encroach on Russia's territorial
integrity. 103 As a result of these conferences, the OSCE issued a unan-
imous declaration, including the Russian delegate's vote, condemning
Outcome of OSCE Mission, Agence Europe, Jan. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Curnws File (European Union supports using OSCF. as a means of addressing Chechen conflict).
97 Doughty; supra note 96 (quoting Budapest Document) (emphasis added); see also Bishop,
supra note 4. Ironically, at the same meeting, Yeltsin fought for an expanded, more powerful
CSCE to diffuse the possibility of an expanding NATO alliance. See John Lloyd & Bruce Clark,
Russia, U.S. Square off Over Security: Differing Views about Expanding Role of ascii:, FIN. TIMES,
NOV. 28, 1994, at 2, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File. Yeltsin warned that an
enlarged NATO threatened Russia, recalling that "Europe has not freed itself Born the heritage
of the Cold War {and] is in danger of plunging into a Cold Peace.* See Gordon Barthos, Russia
"fakes Centre Stage in Emerging Europe, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 9, 1994, at A29, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Curnws File.
98 See Marc Rogers, CSCE Summit Struggles with Future Security, JANE'S DEF. WEEKLY, Dec. 17,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
99 See, e.g., Doughty, supra note 96. In addition to accusations involving the OSGE Code of
Conduct, German Defense Minister Volker Retitle called attention to Russian violations of other
OSCE agreements—specilically, the 1992 and 1994 Vienna Documents on Confidence and
Security Building, which required Russia to notify all OSCE states of its troop movements larger
than 9,000 soldiers and invite observers to force movements of more than 13,000. See, e.g., Jaura,
supra note 89; Whitney, supra note 85, at A6. Although the Russian incursion in Chechnya
involved well over 40,000 troops, the OSGE never received the requisite notification. Nelan, supra
note 69, at 50.
I' See, e.g., Kempster, supra note 20, at A9; John Goshko, OSCE Role in Chechnya Possible—
Russians Open for Aid in Ending Bloodshed, Christopher Says, WASH. Posr, Jan. 6, 1995, at A26.
101 Jaura, supra note 89.
m See Goshko, supra note 100, at A26.
"Justice Minister and OSCE Envoy Discuss Cliechen Conflict, TASS, Jan. 9, 1995, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
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Russian violations of human rights and international humanitarian law
in Chechnya but expressly recognizing Russia's territorial integrity.' 44
Although Russia expressed initial reluctance toward the idea of an
actual OSCE mission to Chechnya during the conflict itself, Russian
Foreign Minister Kozyrev eventually acceded to Gyarmati's request for
permission to send an OSCE mission to Chechnya.'" 5 Russia's Chair-
man of the State Duma Committee for International Affairs sub-
sequently acknowledged that Russia had an obligation to comply with
the OSCE Code of Conduct, and thus an OSCE mission to Russia
would be legal as a matter of Russian law."'" This marked the first time
that Russia allowed an international organization to play a role in what
it regarded as a purely internal matter.m 7
The first OSCE trip to Chechnya lasted three days, during which
the OSCE delegation, guided by Russian forces, observed conditions
in Grozny. 1°8
 Even with Russian forces in complete control of the scope
of the OSCE mission, the OSCE delegation nevertheless declared the
situation "catastrophic" and "unacceptable in terms of European
norms." 109
 The OSCE mission concluded that Russia's intervention in
Chechnya involved a "disproportionate and indiscriminate" use of
force, specifically condemning Russian bombing runs on populated
areas of Chechnya."" In response to these OSCE findings, the Russian
Federation finally admitted that its forces had committed human rights
1°4
	 Goldstein, supra note 5; Jane Perlez, Struggle in Russia: In Europe, Russia Agrees to
Accept Fact Finding Mission, N.Y. TuuEs, Jan. 14, 1995, at 6.
1 °5 See, e.g., Freeland and Thornhill, supra note 22, at 22; Hiatt, supra. note 78, at A211; OSCE
Delegation to Visit Chechnya Within Days, supra note 22; l'erlez, supra note 104, at 6.
106
 Russian Reaction: Duma Official Supports Deploying OSCE Observers in Chechnya, BBC
Monitoring Service, Jan. 19, 1995, from Interfax, Jan. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Curnws File.
1 "7 See Chrystia Freeland, Russia's Rights Monitor Denied Chechen Trip, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1995, at 2, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
11 '9 Richard Boudreaux, Russia Faulted for Excesses in Chechnya, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at
A4.
109 Boudreaux, supra note 108, at 4; ONCE Decries Chechen War as "Catastrophe," UPI, Jan. 30,
1995, available in WESTLAW, Int-News Database. The extent to which the Russian military
controlled the scope of the OSCE mission became clear when it refused to allow Sergei Kuvalyov,
Russia's controversial Human Rights Commissioner who opposed Russia's use of force in Chech-
nya, to accompany the OSCE delegation. OSCE Tour of Chechnya was a Farce Moscow TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File (criticizing OSCE mission for being
too conciliatory to Russian military); see also Freeland, supra note 107, at 2.
"°Boudreaux, supra note 108, at 4. The OSCE mission also criticized Chechen conduct for
violating international norms. OSCE Tour of Chechnya was a Farce, supra note 109. The OSCE
mission did not, however, fend any evidence to confirm accusations that Russian forces were
mistreating Chechen prisoners during its visit to a Russian detention center. Boudreaux, supra
note 108, at 4.
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violations in Chechnya, but it insisted that the Dudayev regime had
perpetrated numerous atrocities of its own."'
After a second, brief OSCE mission to Chechnya also condemned
Russian troops' "disproportionate use of force," the OSCE, with the
support of its member states, began to press for a more substantial role
in resolving the conflict." 2 OSCE Chairman Laszlo Kovacs initiated
discussions with President Yeltsin on the possibilities for a permanent
OSCE mission to Chechnya that could try to restore the rule of law as
well as investigate, prosecute, and bring to justice human rights
claims.'" In addition, the OSCE offered its services to help broker a
peace settlement."'
On March 10, 1995, President Yeltsin agreed in principle to allow
a human rights mission from the OSCE to maintain a presence in
Chechnya." 5 Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev affirmed this commit-
ment by assuring European politicians that Russia would accept a
long-term mission of OSCE international mediators to the Chechen
war zone."`' Currently, this OSCE mission still lacks a clear mandate,
and it remains unclear how effective its efforts can be in the absence
of a durable cease-fire." 7 Nevertheless, the Russian Federation now has
clearly committed itself both to recognizing the applicability of OSCE
norms to the fighting in Chechnya and to accepting a role for an OSCE
mission to assist in the implementation and enforcement of such
norms. 118
111 See Press Conference with Russian Federation Justice Minister Valentin Konalyav an the Results
of the OSCE Session, Official Kremlin lot l News Broadcasts, Feb. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS,
World Library, Curnws File ("We cannot deny the circumstance that in the course of the [Russian]
operation to disarm unlawful [Chechen] armed formations the fundamental right of persons to
life was violated. This cannot be denied because stray bullets, stray shrapnel claimed the lives of
peaceful totally innocent people.").
112 Steve Pagani, OSCE Hopes to Set Up Permanent Mission in Chechnya, Reuters World Service,
Mar. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File; see also Erlanger, supra note 83, at
10 (both European Union and United States pressured Yeltsin to accept a role for the OSCE in
resolving Chechen crisis).
113 See. Pagani, supra note 112.
"4 See OSCE Offers to Help Broker Chechnya Peace, Reuters World Service, Mar. 7, 1995,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
115 Erlanger, supra note 83, at A10.
116John Thornhill, Kozyrev Pledge on Mediators for Chechnya, FIN. Timm, Mar. 10, 1995, at 2,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws File.
117 Id.
118 See Freeland, supra note 107, at 2; see aLso Russian Reaction: Duma Official Supports
Deploying OSCE Observers in Chechnya, supra note 106.
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II. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
CHECHEN CONFLICT
A. The Status of the Chechen Conflict Under International Law
In delineating which international legal norms apply to an armed
conflict, international law maintains a distinction between conflicts of
international and non-international characters. 11g In practice, this has
meant a fairly specific set of norms apply to those armed conflicts
labeled "international," leaving a far more ambiguous set of principles
to govern those armed conflicts not of an international character.'"
Thus, Article 2, common to all four Geneva Conventions, limits their
numerous protections to conflicts between contracting parties or powers
(i.e., states) with the sole exception of those norms listed in Common
Article 3, which cover "armed conflict[s] not of an international char-
acter." 12 ' The 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (the "Proto-
cols") affirm this distinction. Protocol I enumerates a large number of
supplementary norms relating to the protection of victims of interna-
tional armed conflicts, while Protocol II addresses the more limited
11`9
	 e.g., RALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 26-27; Richard Baxter, his in Bella Inferno: The.
Present and Future Law, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 518,518 U.N. Moore
ed., 1974). Although the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols firmly maintain this distinction,
a certain irony exists in that many of the substantive norms that these treaties indicate apply only
in an international conflict derive from the seminal work The Lieber Code of 1863, which outlined
the laws of war applicable in a non-international context—the U.S. Civil War. See, e.g., KarnuovEN,
supra note 12, at 11 -12; George I). Haimbaugh, Jr., Humanitarian Law: The Lincoln
-Lieber
13 GA. J. INT'L & COMI'. L. '245,245-46 (1983).
120
 See, e.g., RALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 26-27; HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNA'EIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 42-48 (1990) (acknowledges
existence of minimal protections in non-international conflicts, but notes they fall far short of
those available in international conflicts). Both sets of norms require as a precondition the
existence of an "armed conflict" (i.e., as opposed to riots, protests, maneuvers, etc.). See ADAM
ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFE, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 12-13 (Roberts & Guelff eds.
1982).
121 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, arts. 2,3. Common Article 2 provides:
IT] he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no
armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their
mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation
to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof'.
Id.
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protection afforded victims of non-international armed conflicts.' 22
Protocol I, Article 1(4) does, however, significantly extend the defini-
tion of an "international" conflict to include wars of national liberation
involving a case of decolonization, alien occupation or self-determina-
tion.'" Still, an analysis of which rules apply to armed conflicts such as
Chechnya begins with a question of which label—international or
non-international—attaches to the conflict as a matter of international
law.' 24
1. Chechnya as an International Conflict?' 25
An examination of the scope of both the Geneva Conventions (as
defined by Common Article 2) and Protocol I reveals two separate
situations in which their rules apply to armed struggles involving a
single contracting state.' 26 First, by ratifying the Geneva Conventions,
a state agrees to apply the Conventions' standards in armed conflicts
with a Power not a party to the Conventions if the latter accepts and
122 See Protocol I , ,supra note 13, art. 1(3) (defining its scope of application to accord with
those situations referred to in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions); Protocol El, supra
note 13, art. 1 (defining its scope of application to develop and supplement Common Article 3
of Geneva Conventions).
123 See Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 1(4). This expansion of the definition has engendered
continuous controversy and is cited as one of the primary reasons for the United States' failure
to ratify Protocol I. See, e.g., KWAKWA, supra note 12, at 49; see also Agora: The U.S. Decision not
to Ratify Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims, 81 AM. J. INT'L L.
912 (1987); Hans-Peter Gasser, Some Legal Issues Concerning Ratification of the 1977 Geneva
Protocols, in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW 94-95 (1989); Theodore Meron, The Time Has
Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol I, 88 Am. J. INT'L L. 678 (1994).
124 see, e.g., ....nu 'L.SHOVEN, supra note 12, at 26-27; KWAKWA, Supra, note 12, at 43; Alfred P.
Rubin, The Status of Rebels Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 472,
474-75 (1972).
125 Cf. Rubin, .supra note 124, at 474-75 (finding it useful to analyze applicability of the
Geneva Convention's Common Article 2 to internal rebellions hefore looking to Common Article
3), In particular, if the Chechen situation constitutes an "international" conflict within the scope
of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, both Russian and Chechen forces would therefore
become obligated to adhere to some 400 standards of conduct, such as the humane treatment
of prisoners of war, Genera Convention III, supra note 13, art. 13, the evacuation of such prisoners
of war from combat zones as soon as possible after their capture, Geneva Convention 111, supra
note 13, art. 19, and distinguishing at all times between the civilian population and combatants
and protecting the former front indiscriminate attacks, Protocol I, supra note 13, arts. 48, 51(4).
Moreover, the norms for international conflicts also provide (in theory) for collective and
individual responsibility in the event of any violations of their standards. See. K.A1-SHOVEN, supra
note 12, at 64-69.
1211
	 Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 2; Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 1(4). In the
case of Chechnya, only the Russian Federation qualifies as a contracting state, having signed and
ratified the Geneva Conventions as well as both Protocols. See supra note 13 and accompanying
text. Thus, none of the other grounds for invoking the Geneva Conventions under Common
Article 2—e.g., cases of declared war or other armed conflicts between contracting parties and
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applies its provisions.' 27
 Second, in ratifying Protocol I, a state also
consents to apply the Conventions and Protocol I to certain wars of
national liberation. 128
 In either case, both sides to the conflict—the
contracting state (i.e., Russia) and the non-contracting belligerent
(i.e., Chechen secessionists)—would become legally bound to adhere
to the laws of war for an "international" conflict in their struggle. 129
Under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, a "Power"
not a party to the Conventions can bind a contracting state to the
Conventions' standards if it also accepts and applies the Conventions'
provisions itself. 19° For the war in Chechnya to qualify as an interna-
tional conflict under this test, therefore, it must meet two conditions.m
First, the secessionist Chechens must constitute a "Power." 32 Second,
this Chechen "Power" must then accept and apply the Conventions'
provisions.'" Both verbal acts of acceptance and a factual application
of the Conventions' provisions appear necessary to fulfill the second
condition.'" The travaux prepatoires of the Geneva Conventions and
cases of a state's partial or total occupation of a contracting party's territory—appear to apply to
Chechnya. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 2.
121 See Geneva Conventions, .tupra note 13, art. 2 ("Although one of the Powers in conflict
may not be a party to the present Convention [s], the Powers who are parties thereto shall . he
bound by the Convention in relation to said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof."). By ratifying Protocol I, a state agrees to extend its application as well to cases where
a non-contracting party accepts and applies its provisions. See Protocol I, supra note 13, arts. l (3),
96(2) (Protocol binds signatories in sante manner as referred to in Common Article 2 of the
Geneva Conventions).
128 See Protocol 1, supra note 13, arts. 1(4), 96(3).
12°The Russian Federation's legal obligation in these cases derives from its treaty commit-
ments as a party to the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I. See supra notes 13-14 and accompa-
nying text. Locating the source of the secessionist Chechen government's legal obligation to
adhere to these treaties, however, proves more difficult because Chechnya did not (and probably
could not) ratify the Conventions and Protocol I. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 74. Both the
Conventions and Protocol I attempt to address this difficulty by limiting their applicability to
conflicts involving non-contracting parties where that party formally accepts and applies these
treaties. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 2 (non-contracting Power must accept and
apply Conventions in order to bind a contracting state); Protocol I, supra note 13, art, 96(3)
(those insurgent groups meeting definition of Article 1(4) must formally submit a declaration
indicating intention to apply Geneva Conventions and Protocol I to Swiss Government in order
to bind a contracting state). Thus, these situations require a commitment on the part of both
sides before the Conventions and Protocol I will serve as the standards for conduct.
13° Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, all_ 2.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id.; Robin, supra note 124, at 474, 478. The same test would presumably apply in the
case of Protocol I, where a Party not bound by the Convention can bring it into ffirce vis-a-vis a
contracting Party by accepting and applying its provisions, See Protocol I, supra note l3, art. 96(2)
(using same language as found in Common Article 2, but replacing the term "Power" with
"Parties").
134 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 2; Rubin, supra note 124, at 478.
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Protocol 1, moreover, both indicate that a "Power" generally refers only
to states, although it also could refer to a civil war if the established
government recognizes a state of belligerency.'" Where a state refuses
to recognize a state of belligerency, however, the issue of defining a
"Power" will revolve around an entity's claim to statehood.'"''
Two schools of thought exist in international law with respect to
when an entity constitutes a state: the constitutive view and the decla-
rative view."7 The constitutive theory contends that an entity does not
become a state until other states recognize it as such." 8 Under this view,
recognition functions as the constitutive act, determining as a matter
of law the entity's claim to the rights and obligations of statehood.'"
The declarative view, on the other hand, holds that entities become
states under international law, not by recognition, but by possession of
certain objective criteria: (i) a permanent population, (ii) a defined
territory, (iii) a government, and (iv) the capacity to enter into rela-
tions with other states.' 4° Rather than relying on the discretionary,
155 KWAKWA, Supra note 12, at 48 Sr nn.21-23 and accompanying text (citing relevant portions
of treaties' legislative history or "travaux prepatoires" and outlining possibility of using belligerent
status to qualify as a "Power"). Traditionally, the recognition of belligerency involved a process
by which established states recognized the existence of a civil war for the purposes of applying
the laws of war between the incumbent government and insurgents as well as the law of neutrality
between the parties to the conflict and third states. See, e.g., Dietrich Shindler, State of War;
Belligerency, Armed Conflict, in THE NEN HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 3 (A. Cassesse
ed., 1979). Since World War 11, however, states generally have shown a reluctance to recognize
the belligerent status of insurgents in civil wars. id. at 5. The Russian Federation's attitude in
Chechnya comports with this recent trend. Throughout the conflict, the Russian government has
insisted that President Dudayev and his government are common criminals whom it will try, if
captured, according to Russian criminal law. See Chechen Leader Faces Russian Treason Charge,
supra note 17 (Russian government formally charges Chechen President Dudayev with treason).
166 See KWAKWA, supra note 12, at 48.
137 SeeJA m Fs CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-25 (1979); see
also BRIERLY, supra note 8, at 138-39; BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 113-17 (1952); M.K. Malone,
Comment, The Rights of Newly Emerging Democratic States Prior to International Recognition and
the Serbo-Croation Conflict, 86 TEMP. INV!, 8c COMP. L.J. 81,91-92 (1992).
138 See, e.g., I-I. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (1948) (IR .] ecogni-
don, when given in fulfillment of a legal duty . . . is a momentous, decisive and indispensable
function of ascertaining and declaring the existence of the requisite elements of statehood with
a constitutive effect for the commencement of the international rights and duties of the comtnu-
nity in question."); Hans Kelson, Recognition in International Law—Theoretical Observations, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 592-93 (Leo Gross ed., 1969) ("state exists
legally only in its relations to other states . . . the legal act of recognition has a specifically
constitutive character").
159 See LAuTERFAm-rr, supra note 138, at 51; Kelson, supra note 138, at 593.
140 See, e.g., BRIGGS, supra note 137, at 116 (concluding act of recognition not constitutive;
its principal juridical function is state's acknowledgment of full status of hitherto indeterminate
community, making possible regularization of relations between them); BRIERLY, supra note 8,
at 139 (finding that grant of recognition is not a constitutive, but a declaratory act; states may
exist without being recognized); CRAWFORD, supra note 137, at 24 (concluding that international
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political nature of recognition, the declarative view's criteria attach the
label "state" based on a question of "effectiveness"—an entity's ability
to exercise authority with respect to persons and property within the
territory claimed (i.e., effective government) as well as to exercise
authority with respect to other international persons (i.e., effective
independence)."' Under the declarative view, therefore, recognition
merely declares the willingness of the recognizing state to treat the
recognized entity as if it possessed international rights and obliga-
tions."'
Applying these theories to Chechnya, the question of its status as
a state turns on which theory governs. Under the constitutive view,
Chechnya clearly does not qualify for statehood: despite three years of
self-declared independence from the Russian Federation, no country
has ever recognized it as a state.'" Under the declarative view, however,
Chechnya possesses a more credible claim. From its declaration of
independence in December 1991, until Russian troops invaded on
December 11, 1994, Chechnya possessed a permanent population,
living within defined borders, governed by President Dudayev and his
administration.'" The fact that President Dudayev's government de-
clined offers of recognition from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, further-
more, indicates an apparent capacity to enter into foreign relations. 145
status of the state as a subject of international law is independent of recognition); see also
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1,
49 Stat. 3097, 3100 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] (listing criteria for statehood). Al-
though the Montevideo Convention involved only American states, it has come to represent the
standard formulation of the basic criteria for statehood. See CRAWFORD, supra note 137, at 36.
James Crawford has argued, however, that in the modern context, the fourth criterion (capacity
to enter into ibreign relations) actually should refer to the broader principle of independence.
Id. at 48.
141
 See CRAWFORD, supra note 137, at 36, 42 n.54. Recent state practice, however, indicates
that effectiveness may act only as the dominant, rather than sole, criterion for statehood; other
factors such as an entity's claim to self-determination also can weigh in the analysis. See id. at
84-85. Thus, in the case of Rhodesia, despite effective control over a defined population and
area, Rhodesia failed to qualify as a state because of its government's nondemocratic nature.
Malone, supra note 137, at 87-88. See the discussion of characterizing Chechnya as a war of
national liberation, infra, for consideration of Chechnya's own claims to self-determination.
142 Malone, supra note 137, at 91.
143
 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (citing fact that no state ever recognized
Chechnya's independence from Russia).
144 See supra notes 59-58 and accompanying text; see also James P. Gallagher, Mention of
Chechens is Enough to Make Blood Curdle, Cm. TRim., Sept. 21, 1994, at 7 (discussing placement
of Russian troops stationed along Chechen border); Mark Trevelyan, Russia Pulls Troops from
Rebel Southern Region, Reuters World Service, Nov. 11, 1992, available in LEXJS, World Library,
Curnws File (Russians pull back troops from Chechen border after threats by President Dudayev
to use force if Russians entered Chechnya).
145 See supra note 49.
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Although Dudayev's authority did not go uncontested inside Chech-
nya, none of the opposition groups ever posed a serious threat to his
government's effective control over the republic or its population.'"
The fact that Russian forces later needed to take such extreme meas-
ures to reassert their control over Chechnya reinforces the argument
that Chechnya possessed an effective government, independent of
Russian control. 147 Based on the declarative view, therefore, legitimate
grounds exist for characterizing Chechnya as a state.'"
Upon considering which of these outcomes actually will apply to
the issue of Chechnya's status as a "Power" under the Geneva Conven-
tions, however, it becomes apparent that the constitutive view will
control.'" One simply cannot ignore the effect of the international
community's universal refusal to recognize Chechnya throughout its
three-year bid for independence.'" Without some such recognition by
at least a part of the international community, Chechnya has no stand-
ing to contend it qualifies as a state.' 5 i Regardless of the extent to which
Chechnya can prove it met the declarative view's objective criteria, no
grounds exist in international law to compel states to accept such
proof.'" The difficulty in enforcing the declarative view in this context
lies in its presumption that decisionmakers exist, independent of states,
who have the authority to disassociate the legal criteria for statehood
from the political acts of recognition.' 53 In analyzing the Chechen
situation, however, only states possess a capacity to apply the legal label
146 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
147 See, e.g., supra notes 64-71, 78-81 (describing level of force used by Russians to take
Grozny).
148 See Montevideo Convention, supra note 140.
149 See Rubin, supra note 124, at 475.
15° See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
151 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (international community universally charac-
terized Chechnya as part of Russian Federation).
152 See BRIGGS, supra note 137, at 115-16 (concluding evidence offered by Lauterpacht and
others demonstrates, contrary to their assertions, that states have no legal duty to recognize an
entity as a state); Rubin, supra note 124, at 476 (governments under no compulsion to acknow-
ledge that its antagonist in conflict is a "Power" within meaning of Geneva Conventions). But see
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 138, at 25 (claiming evidence supports finding that states have legal
duty to recognize entity as a state whenever the requisite conditions or fact exist).
158 CRAWFORD, supra note 137, at 20. In many cases before courts, international tribunals
or arbitrators, this presumption is fully satisfied. In one of the most famous examples, the Tinoco
Arbitration, Chief justice Taft used his authority as arbitrator to reason that where a nation based
its recognition policy not on inquiries into a state's effective control over territory, but rather on
its illegitimacy or irregularity of origin, objective evidence should outweigh such policies. See 18
AM. J. INT'l. L. 147, 154 (1924). Other examples of the adoption of a declarative view of
recognition involve similar situations where decisiontnakers, possessing the necessary authority,
analyze determinations of an entity's claim to statehood independent of the question of recog-
nition.
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"state," and that determination takes the form of recognition. 154 Noth-
ing in the Geneva Conventions provides any basis for finding other-
wise—states continue to retain the authority to decide whether to grant
unrecognized entities the status of statehood in the specific context of
armed conflicts. 155
 One can conclude, therefore, that without recogni-
tion, Chechnya does not qualify as a state, and without statehood, it
cannot constitute a "Power" for the purposes of invoking Article 2 of
the Geneva Conventions. 156
Even assuming that Chechnya somehow qualified as a recognized
"Power," it would still need to meet the second requirement of Article
2 by demonstrating its acceptance and application of the Conventions'
provisions. 157 As for the required acts of acceptance, President Dudayev
twice committed Chechnya to abide by international law in its treat-
ment of captured Russian soldiers. 158
 Both statements, however, in-
volved only Chechnya's treatment of captured soldiers, and neither
referred specifically to the Geneva Conventions.' 59
 It becomes difficult
to conclude, therefore, that these statements alone could serve as
sufficient evidence that Chechnya agreed to accept all the humanitar-
ian norms laid out in the four Geneva Conventions. In terms of its
conduct, moreover, it appears that even in its treatment of captured
soldiers, Chechnya did not actually conform to the rules for interna-
tional conflicts relating to prisoners of war because it used Russian
troops as shields during the battle for Grozny's Presidential Palace.' 6"
As a result, Chechnya lacks sufficient proof to demonstrate either an
acceptance or actual application of the standards enumerated in the
' 54 These determinations can be distinguished, in turn, from state practice involving "un-
official" relations with unrecognized states. See BRIGGS, supra note 137, at 115. In such cases,
states' interactions with unrecognized entities do not rise to a level equivalent to interstate
relations—subject to all the perquisites of statehood—bin rather remain limited to a scope of
interaction dictated by the policy interests of the nonrecognizing state. See Rubin, supra note 124,
at 474-75.
155 See Rubin, supra note 124, at 475.
156 See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
157 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 2.
1 $ See Chechriya—Duma Ends Delegation Visit, supra note 58, and accompanying text
(Dudayev insisting lie would treat captured Russian soldiers in conformity with international law);
see also Dudayev—No More Playing Peacemakers, POWs to be Dealt with by War Laws, supra note
66 (Dudayev declaring captives would be dealt with according to the laws of wartime).
159 See supra note 158.
169 See Stanley, supra note 77 (Chechens kept Russian prisoners in Presidential Palace until
its surrender). Such action most likely violated Geneva Convention III, Article 19, which requires
that as soon as possible after capture, soldiers should be removed from the combat zone, Geneva
Convention III, supra note 13, art. 19. Other reports indicate that Chechen forces also violated
the laws of war by using Chechen civilians and civilian objects as protection from Russian attack,
See, e.g., Human Rights Body Rebukes Both Sides in Chechnya, supra note 76.
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four Geneva Conventions. 16 ' This fact, coupled with the reality that
Chechnya most likely cannot qualify as a "Power," compels the conclu-
sion that the laws governing an international armed conflict could not
be invoked in Chechnya on the basis of the Geneva Conventions'
Common Article 2. 162
If the fighting in Chechnya constitutes a war of national liberation,
however, one could still consider it an international armed conflict
under the terms of Protocol 1. 10 Article 1(4) of Protocol I modifies the
definition of international conflicts for contracting parties to include
wars of national liberation, which involve:
[A]rmed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colo-
nial domination and alien occupation and against racist re-
gimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations.' 54
This definition, when considered in conjunction with the travaux
prepatoires, clearly does not extend the label "international armed
conflict" to all intra-state struggles. 165 In particular, Article 1(4)
requires the satisfaction of two conditions: first, there must be a
people possessing a right to self-determination; and second, on the
basis of that right this group must be engaged in an armed conflict
against colonial domination, alien occupation, or a racist regime.'"6
Assuming the existence of an "armed conflict," the determination
of what constitutes a war of national liberation essentially involves
the question of who has a right to self-determination.' 67
161 See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 156,161 and accompanying text.
163 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. This section considers only the relevance of
Protocol I and its definition of a war of national liberation to Chechnya in light of the Russian
Federation's accession to that treaty, and refrains from considering its propriety as a viable
principle of international humanitarian law.
164 See Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 1(4).
165 KALsuovEN, supra note 12, at 73-74. The drafters of Article 1(4) intended it to cover
contemporary issues of decolonization, alien occupation and racist regimes, particularly the
situations in Portugal, Israel and South Africa. See WiLsoN, supra note 120, at 168. Nevertheless,
despite the tentative resolution of those issues today, the wording of Article 1(4) permits further
analysis of its applicability to secessionist struggles such as that in Chechnya. See id.
166 See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 53-54 (1957)
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]; see also KWAKWA, supra note 12, at
52; WILSON, supra note 120, at 166-67.
167 See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, Stipra note 166, at 54-55 (Article 1 (4)'s
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Article 1(4) refers to a right to self-determination as defined in
the U.N. Charter and the Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.'"8
Both documents take a restrictive approach to the issue, reflecting the
practice of both states and the United Nations, limiting the right to
self-determination to the context of decolonization." The U.N. Char-
ter contains only two broad references to self-determination, neither
of which establish any right to self-determination. 17" The Declaration
on Friendly Relations does expressly recognize a right to self-determi-
nation, but restricts that right on the basis of territory: only those
peoples living in non-contiguous, separate territorial units (e.g., colo-
nies, non self-governing territories, mandates, trust territories, etc.)
possess a right to self-determination. 171
 The Declaration on Friendly
Relations does not, however, extend this right to minority groups living
listed motives for the armed conflict—colonial domination, alien occupation and a racist. re-
gime—cover all possible circumstances in which peoples are struggling liar the exercise of their
right to self-determination); WILSON, supra note 120, at 166-67 (definition of "peoples" for
purposes of Article 1(4) application involves questions of right to self-determination); Gasser,
supra note 123, at 95 (application of Article 1 (4) confined to narrow concept of right of
self-determination by a people).
165
 See Protocol 1, supra note 13, art. 1(4); see also KWAKWA, supra note 12, at 53.
169 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55; Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 8. The
literature on the linkage of self-determination to decolonization is vast. See, e.g., KWAKWA, supra
note 12, at 53; Guyora Binder, The Case for Sq.-Determination, 20 STAN, J. INT'I, L. 223 (1994);
Laurence S. Hanauer, The Irrelevance of Self-Determination Law to Ethno-National Conflict: A New
Look at the Western Sahara Case, 9 EMORY INT'L L. lbw. (forthcoming 1995); Hurst Hannum,
Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. j. INV'. L. 1 (1993).
1711 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55 (both articles affirm interest in "principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples"); WILSON, supra note 120, at 59.
171
 See Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 8 ("[A]ll peoples have the right
freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their
economic, social and cultural development, and every State has a duty to respect this right . . .").
The Declaration defines this right to self-determination on a territorial basis, specifically empha-
sizing the separate status of colonies and non-self-governing territories while simultaneously
recognizing the inviolability of the territorial integrity of existing, representative states. See id.
Other U.N. documents and state practice have adopted a similar approach, such that a people's
right to self-determination now requires a connection to a defined space of territory, separated
from an already sovereign state. See, e.g., Wu.soty, supra note 120, at 88 (concluding that trust
territories, mandates, non-self-governing territories and geographically distinct territories possess
right to self-determination); Hanauer, supra note 169 (in addition to being ethnically or culturally
distinct, people possessing right to self-determination must also possess connection to defined
territory, which is not organized within already sovereign state); Hafium, supra note 169, at
32-33 (only situations where European Power dominated non-contiguous territory in which a
majority of population was indigenous or non-metropolitan, has that territory been considered
to have absolute right of self-determination). This United Nations grant of a territorially-based
right to self-determination in the decolonization context should not be confused, however, with
United States President Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination, the applicability of
which depended upon the existence of a distinct ethnic-linguistic nationality. See Hannurn, supra
note 169, at 32.
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within an established state possessing a representative government
because of the principle of uti posseditis juris—the notion that the
territorial integrity of existing states must be maintained.' 72
Given Article 1 (4)'s narrow definition, therefore, it becomes ap-
parent that no credible basis exists for labeling the Chechen conflict
a war of national liberation within the meaning of Protocol I. 173 Despite
the existence of an ongoing armed conflict and the fact that Russia
historically colonized Chechnya, the Chechen separatists nevertheless
lack the essential right to self-determination.' 74 Chechnya clearly lies
within the recognized borders of the Russian Federation and thus does
not possess the non-contiguous, separate character necessary for exer-
cising a right to self-determination.' 75 If anything, Chechnya's at-
tempted secession involves the type of situation expressly excluded
from the scope of this right to self-determination because of the su-
pervening right of existing states to maintain their territorial integ-
rity. 176 Without this right to self-determination, moreover, no founda-
tion exists to claim that the fighting in Chechnya constitutes an
international armed conflict as a war of national liberation within the
meaning of Protocol I, Article 1(4). 177
172 See Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 8 (declaration does not authorize
actions which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent states which possess a representative government); see also
Hanauer, supra note 169; Christian j. Garris, Bosnia and the Limits of International Law, 34 SeorrA
CLARA L. REV. 1039,1066-67 (1994) (principle of territorial sovereignty places limits on right of
self-determination, subjugating latter principle to the former); WILSON „supra note 120, at 166
(Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations excludes from its application those living in sover-
eign and independent states possessing a representative government). The reasoning behind this
distinction lies in the fact that if any minority group (there are more than 100 within the Russian
Federation alone) could secede from an existing state based on a right to self-determination, it
would seriously destabilize the international political order. See KWAKIVA, supra note 12, at 54
(citing catastrophic results in Africa if each of the 2000 ethnic groups possessed the right to
establish a separate state).
173 See Protocol I, supra note 13, art, 1 (4).
174 See id.; supra notes 31-32 (describing Russia's 19th century conquest and colonization of
Chechnya).
175 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
1711 See supra note 172 and accompanying text (no right to self-determination where it would
violate an existing, independent state's territorial integrity or political unity).
m Several other basic problems exist with regard to considering the Chechen conflict a war
of national liberation. First, the issue of recognition, already discussed with respect to Chechnya's
claim to statehood, remains prominent. See supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text. Even if
one could argue that Chechnra fulfills the criteria for a war of national liberation, unless states,
particularly Russia, recognize that status, serious difficulties exist with respect to the practical
application of the Geneva Conventions or Protocol 1 on the basis of Article 1(4). See id.; see also
KWAKWA, supra note 12, at 56-57 (acknowledging problem of autointerpretation under Article
1(4) in that few states will admit willingly that they are racist regimes or that they exercise colonial
or alien domination). Second, assuming states recognize that the Chechen conflict falls within
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On the basis of this analysis, one can conclude that the fighting
in Chechnya does not constitute an international armed conflict.
Chechnya lacks the necessary status as either a "Power" under Com-
mon Article 2 or a "war of national liberation" under Protocol I, Article
1(4) to invoke the larger set of humanitarian provisions provided by
the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I.t 7H This conclusion does not
mean, however, that no rules of international law apply to the fighting
in Chechnya.'" Both Protocol II and Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions establish international legal standards of conduct for non-
international armed conflicts.'"
2. Chechnya as a Non-International Armed Conflict
In non-international armed conflicts, two different sets of stand-
ards apply depending on the intensity and nature of the fighting.' 81
Common Article 3 stretches broadly, covering all those who are victims
of internal armed conflicts.' 82
 Its general principles apply without re-
strictions to "the case of armed conflict not of an international char-
acter occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Par-
ties."'" Unlike rules governing international armed conflicts,
moreover, Common Article 3 does not require a declaration of accep-
the scope of Article 1(4), the rules governing international armed conflicts still will not automat-
ically apply. Article 96(3) of Protocol I requires that for the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I
to come into force between the warring parties, not only must the specific criteria fOr a war of
national liberation exist, but also the insurgent group must address a unilateral declaration to
the treaties' depository (Switzerland) stating that it undertakes to apply the Conventions and
Protocol Ito the conflict. See Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 96(3); see also COMMENTARY ON TEIE
ADIMTIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 166, at 1089; KALSMOVEN, supra note 12, at 73-74. No
evidence exists to show that the secessionist Chechen government ever submitted such a decla-
ration.
178 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 2; Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 1(4).
179 See, e.g., Protocol II, supra note 13; Genera Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3.
181) See Protocol II, supra note 13; Geneva Conventions, supra, note 13, art. 3.
181 David P. Forsythe, The Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol of Non
-Inter-
national Armed Conflicts, 72 Ma, J. INT'', L. 272, 286 (1978). Both documents require at a
minimum the existence of an "armed conflict." See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3;
Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 1(1); see alsoJames E. Bond, Internal Conflict and Article Three of
the Geneva Conventions, 48 DENY. L.J. 263, 270 (1971) (concluding that Article 3 incorporates
belligerencies and civil wars, but not riots and insurrections); Rubin, supra note 124, at 484.
Although the definition of an armed conflict remains somewhat ambiguous, Protocol II, Article
I (2) clarifies its meaning by providing that: "lt]his Protocol shall not apply to situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other
acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts." Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 1(2).
185 Baxter, supra note 119, at 520. But see Rubin, supra note 124, at 483 (asserting text of
Common Article 3 seems to exclude protection in skirmishes at sea or in neighboring territory).
183 Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3.
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tance by a non-contracting party. Both sides become bound by Article
3 once the criteria for its application exist. 1144
Protocol II's twenty-eight provisions, on the other hand, cover a
narrower band of non-international armed conflicts.' 85
 Under Article
1(1), Protocol II applies only to those Common Article 3 conflicts
where dissident armed forces (i) function under a responsible (i.e.,
organized) command, (ii) control a part of the State's territory, (iii)
conduct military operations of a sustained and concerted character,
and (iv) possess an ability to implement Protocol 11.' 86
 These require-
ments effectively exclude from the scope of Protocol II a variety of
underground guerrilla movements.' 87 The minimum level at which the
provisions of Protocol H apply thus involves a more sustained, intense
armed conflict than the level of fighting necessary to implicate Com-
mon Article 3. 188
Like the question of statehood discussed supra, however, whether
a conflict rises to the level required by Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions (or to the even higher level of Protocol II) ultimately will
depend on the issue of recognition. 189 With no outside binding author-
ity competent to determine when the criteria for a non-international
armed conflict exist, a State remains free to label its internal struggles
as it sees fit. 190 This power of recognition does not, however, go so far
184 See id. Although this conclusion poses few problems for a Contracting State which ex-
pressly acceded to this provision, the basis on which insurgent groups are bound by this provision
proves more difficult to discern. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 119, at 527-28 (noting difficulty in
binding insurgents to conventional rules on non-international conflicts, and positing that rebels
can be bound to these standards on theory that treaty binds all citizens of that State).
188 See, e.g., KALSHOYEN, supra note 12, at 138.
188 See Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 1; COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra
note 166, at 1352-53. Protocol II, Article 1(1) provides in full:
This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of appli-
cation, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of
[Protocol 11 and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations
and to implement this Protocol.
Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 1(1).
187 See KALsHov EN , supra note 12, at 138. Guerrilla movements excluded by Protocol II would
thus include those using various "hit-and-run" tactics, those operating without a territorial base,
and those that lack a sufficient governmental structure to apply the Protocol's provisions. See id.
188 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 166, at 1348. Once a Protocol
LI situation exists, however, both the norms of Protocol II and those of Common Article 3 govern
the conflict in question. Id. at 1350.
188 See Baxter, supra note 119, at 523.
190 See KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 137-38; see also THEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
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as to permit Contracting States to ignore completely their international
legal obligations. 19 ' At a certain point, the existence of an ongoing
international armed conflict becomes difficult for a State to deny.' 92 In
such situations, both States and insurgent groups often become willing
to acknowledge the applicability of the principles of Common Article
3 to their conflict, and pledge to act accordingly. 193
In analyzing the applicability of both Common Article 3 and
Protocol II to Chechnya, it becomes apparent from the severity of the
fighting that this struggle falls within the last category of situations,
where one cannot deny the existence of an ongoing armed conflict,'"
At a minimum, the principles of Common Article 3 apply, given that
the fighting took place within the territory of a contracting state
(Russia) and that the struggle's intensity rose to the level of an armed
conflict. 195
 In particular, the deaths of thousands of soldiers and civil-
ians as well as the wholesale destruction of entire cities pose serious
difficulties for any argument that the Chechen struggle does not rise
to the level of an armed conflict. 1 "6
Upon further analysis, the Chechen conflict also appears to fall
within the narrower scope of Protocol II based on the criteria listed in
Article I (1).' 97
 Little question exists that Chechen resistance initially
exercised, under an organized command system, actual control over
Chechnya, enabling it to pursue sustained and concerted military
operations against intruding Russian forces, as well as to implement
Protocol II. 198
 Unlike the conclusion that the fighting in Chechnya
iNTERNAL STRIFE: TDEIR INTERNATIONAL. PROTECTION 47 (1987) (states are reluctant to admit
that strife occurring within their territory has reached proportions of armed conflict).
191 See KALstiovm, supra note 12, at 137-38.
192 Id. at 59-60.
193 See Bond, supra note 181, at 272-73 (when a conflict drags on, states do accept some
obligation to treat opposing forces in conformity with Common Article 3); Forsythe, supra note
181, at 274-76 (listing cases where states and dissident forces have agreed formally or infbrmally
to apply Common Article 3). Included among the cases where both sides explicitly accepted
Common Article 3 are France-Algeria (1956), Lebanon (1958), Cuba (1959) and Yemen (1962).
Forsythe, supra note 181, at 275. But see Bond, supra note 181, at 271-72 (citing examples of
internal conflicts within Nigeria, Indonesia and Portugal's African colonies where states refused
to apply Common Article 3's provisions). Although not undertaken here, a similar study of cases
recognizing the application of Protocol II would prove useful for further analysis of the exact
scope of that treaty.
194 See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
195 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3.
' 96 See supra note 70, and accompanying text (describing high costs in lives and property
caused by was in Chechnya).
197 See Protocol 11, supra note 13, art, 1(1).
199
 See id.; COMMENTARY ON 'I'llE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 166, at 1351-53 (de-
tailing criteria for Protocol II's application); see also supra note 144 (describing Chechen control
824	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 (Vol. 36:793
must constitute an armed conflict, however, this analysis does not
remain free of doubt, particularly from the Russian Federation's per-
spective. 199 Nevertheless, if one puts aside for the moment this question
of Russia's recognition of a Protocol II situation, an objective analysis
of the Chechen conflict leads to the conclusion that the fighting in
Chechnya falls within the scope of Protocol II. 200 With respect to the
international legal standards applicable to the Chechen conflict, there-
fore, the substantive standards of both Protocol II and Common Article
3 appear to govern the conduct of the warring parties. 201
B. The Prohibitions of International Law and the War in Chechnya
Given circumstances warranting the application of the legal stand-
ards for non-international armed conflicts, what protections do these
norms provide? The Geneva Conventions' Article 3 serves in this re-
spect as a "miniature Bill of Rights," laying out general, baseline prin-
ciples, rather than specifying any precise guidelines. 202 It outlines those
standards that parties to an internal conflict are "bound to apply, as a
minimum:1° The text of Article 3 provides in pertinent part:
[E]ach Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or
any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated hu-
manely, without any adverse distinction founded on race,
of its borders prior to Russian operation); supra note 78-81 (describing intensity and duration
of Chechen-Russian fighting in Grozny).
199 For example, the Russian Federation justified its use of force in Chechnya, in part, on the
ground that a state of lawlessness existed. See Sheets, supra note 53. On the basis of this assertion,
Russia could refuse to recognize the responsible or organized nature of Chechen secessionists,
thereby denying the application of Protocol II. See id.; supra notes 186-87 and accompanying
text. The situation becomes even more complex in light of the Chechen forces' switch from
conventional to guerrilla tactics. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
206 See Protocol II, supra note 13. See infra notes 257-269, for a discussion of the problems
of recognition with respect to the issues of implementation and enforcement of international law
in internal wars.
2° 1 See Protocol 11, supra note 13; Geneva Conventions, supra, note 13, art. 3.
2°2 See Baxter, supra note 119, at 520. Article 3's ambiguity led Forsythe to observe that "[n]t)
one has been completely sure as to what factual situations the article applies, and no one has
been totally sure exactly what is prohibited in whatever situation it is that is regulated." Forsythe,
supra note 181, at 273.
203 Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3; KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 59-60.
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colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other
similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohib-
ited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to
the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of execu-
tions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the {International
Committee of the Red Cross] may offer its services to the
Parties to the conflict . . . .
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. 204
As a general principle, therefore, Article 3 requires humane treat-
ment without discrimination for all those who take no active part
in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have
surrendered or are hors de combat."' Article 3 thus only protects
non-combatants, with combatants falling outside of its protective
ambit. 200
 In terms of defining "humane treatment," Article 3 lists
particular acts which would violate this principle, including murder,
the taking of hostages, and the passing of sentences without pre-
vious judgments by a constituted court. 207
On the whole, however, the provisions of Common Article 3 lack
specificity; they do not prohibit particular means of warfare or address
204
 Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3.
202 KAtstiovEN, supra note 1_2, at 59-60. In fact, humane treatment amounts to the only
requirement of Article 3; the parties are free to act without reference to such provisions as
prisoner-of-war status. Id. at 60.
2°6 Bond, supra note 181, at 279.
" 7 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3. These specific requirements prove prob-
lematic when one considers the very different perspective of a rebel group suddenly obligated to
care fully for the sick and wounded or to set up regularly constituted courts, even though such
activities may prove impossible in actual circumstances, See Rubin, supra note 124, at 485.
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rules for sparing the civilian population during hostilities. 2" These
ambiguities require the extensive use of analogies to the Geneva Con-
ventions, among other documents, to give meaning to Article 3 terms
such as "cruel treatment" and "all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized people."'" Analogies remain
subject, however, to varying interpretations, oftentimes conflicting
ones. Reasonable persons can disagree, for example, over issues such
as whether firing into an area containing both combatant forces and
non-combatants violates the principle of "humane treatment." 21° As a
result, Article 3's broad protections provide little in terms of effective
guidelines for the actual conduct of warring parties. 2"
In substance, Protocol II attempts to further develop and supple-
ment the general principles established by Common Article 3 for
certain non-international armed conflicts. 212 In scope, its protections
extend beyond the non-combatants protected by Common Article 3 to
cover "all persons affected by [the] armed conflict." 213 As with Article
3, moreover, Protocol II's fundamental principle requires that all per-
sons not currently taking part in the hostilities receive humane treat-
ment, without any adverse discrimination. 2 " Protocol II also contains
articles specifically addressing the protection of persons whose liberty
has been restricted (Article 5), the wounded and sick (Articles 7-8),
21:18 See COMMENTARY ON Tilt: ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 166, at 1326; Bond, supra
note 181, at 278.
209 See Bond, supra note 181, at 279-83. Bond thus used the Hague Conventions, which
address the types of weapons prohibited in warfare, to link the prohibition of cruel treatment
with the concept of proscribing unnecessary suffering. Id. at 279.
210 See id. at 279-80. What can soldiers do when they are attacked by a sniper located in a
hospital? How much, if any, force can they use to subdue him or her without violating the
principle of "humane treatment" outlined in Article 3? The answers depend on whom you
ask—the patients in the hospital or the soldiers (and possibly civilians) being shot at in the street.
See Id.
211 Baxter, supra note 119, at 528-29. See Bond, supra note 181, at 279. None of this, however,
detracts from Common Article 3's major accomplishment—establishing the interest of interna-
tional law in the conduct of armed conflicts occurring within a single State.
212 KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 137. Protocol II's provisions continue, however, to fall far
short of the parallel protections available in Protocol 1 and the Genera Conventions for interna-
tional armed conflicts. See Forsythe, .supra note 181, at 279-82 (explaining that drafters substan-
tially reduced Protocol It's provisions upon inclusion of wars of national liberation within mean-
ing of international armed conflicts).
213 Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 2; see also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS,
supra note 166, at 1359 (coverage of Protocol 11 intended to extend to civilian and military
personnel, combatants and non-combatants).
214 See Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 4(1) ("All persons who do not take a direct part or who
have ceased to take part in hostilities . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without
any adverse distinction.").
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medical units and personnel (Articles 9-12) and the civilian popula-
tion (Articles 1 3-1 7).'''
In particular, Protocol H's provisions respecting the civilian popu-
lation provide several protections not specifically available under Com-
mon Article 3.21 ' Protocol II clearly establishes, in Article 13(2), that
the civilian population shall not be the direct object of attack. 217 This
prohibition extends to those acts that have as their primary purpose
the spreading of terror among the civilian population. 218 In addition,
civilians receive "general protection against the dangers arising from
military operations" (i.e., collateral damage). 219
 During any time in
which civilians take a direct part in hostilities, however, the above
protections do not apply. 220
In addition to protecting civilians as individuals, Protocol II also
protects those objects indispensable to the civilian population's sur-
vival, for example, drinking water and food. 22 ' Attacks on dams, dykes
or nuclear energy plants are prohibited because of the severe losses
among the civilian population that would result from their destruc-
tion. 222
 Finally, Article 18 of Protocol II provides that where the civilian
population suffers undue hardship owing to a lack of essential supplies,
relief actions shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the con-
tracting state concerned, 223
Protocol H's treatment of civilian protections is also significant in
what it does not provide. Although it clearly seeks to avoid charac-
terizing large parts of the civilian population as quasi-combatants,
Protocol II does not include a definition of "civilian," making it unclear
exactly how its protections against attack should apply.'" Unlike Pro-
215 See Protocol II, supra note 13.
216 See Gasser, supra note 123, at 97. An artich.--by-article analysis of the 28 Protocol II
provisions would prove too lengthy for the purposes of this Note. Therefore, only the particular
provisions related to the protection of the civilian population are explored herein. Further
analysis of the application of the remainder of Protocol H (i.e., its rules relating to the treatment
of captured soldiers) must await future study.
217 Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 13(2).
sls Id.
219 1d. art. 13(1); see also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL. PROTOCOLS, supra note 166, at
1449 (defining military operations as movements of attack or defense by armed forces in action).
220 Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 13(3).
221 1d. art. 14.
222 Id. art. 15; see also COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 166, at 1462
(objects mentioned in Article 15 constitute an exhaustive list).
223
 Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 18; see also id. art. 16 (protecting cultural objects and special
places of worship); id. art. 17 (prohibiting the forced movements of civilians).
221 See KAISuOVEN, supra note 12, at 144; L. Doswald-Beck, The Value of the 1977 Geneva
Protocols for the Protection of Civilians, in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW 137, 163 (1989).
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tocol 1, Protocol II lacks a rule providing that the presence of insur-
gents among the civilian population does not deprive civilians of their
protected status.225
 Moreover, amendments specifically prohibiting
methods of combat that affect civilians indiscriminately and the use of
civilians as shields were ultimately rejected and left out of Protocol II's
final version. 225
 The exclusion of these rules from Protocol II of course
does not mean that such acts are permitted, but rather leaves open the
door for competing interpretations of which groups and what circum-
stances warrant protection. 227 Thus, although Protocol II does repre-
sent a significant improvement over the generalities of Common Arti-
cle 3, problems with interpreting its own specific ambiguities remain. 228
Even after taking into account the ambiguities of Common Article
3 and Protocol II, however, an application of these standards to the
situation in Chechnya still suggests that both sides have seriously vio-
lated the laws of war for non-international conflicts. 229 Evidence exists
that Chechen forces used civilians, civilian centers and captured Rus-
sian soldiers as shields throughout the hostilities. 250 Under the Geneva
Conventions' Article 3, these facts, if true, should constitute inhumane
or cruel treatment of persons not actively engaged in hostilities, or,
with respect to the Russian soldiers, fall within the prohibition of
hostage taking. 23 ' Similarly, by using civilians and civilian objects as
shields, Chechen forces placed civilians in positions likely to become
subject to attack, in apparent violation of Protocol Il's Article l 3(1 )
requirement that civilians receive protection where possible from the
consequences of military operations.232
The massive Russian bombing campaign of Grozny and surround-
ing cities also should constitute a violation of the protections of both
225 See Protocol 1, supra note 13, art. 50(3) (presence within civilian population of persons
not defined as civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character); see also COM-
MENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 166, at 1452.
'2`2G THE LA1A' OF' NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 468-69 (R. Levee ed., 1987) (Drafting
Committee's version including articles prohibiting indiscriminate attacks and use of civilians as
shields rejected by a vote of 30 to 25, with 34 abstentions). Interestingly enough, as will he
discussed infra, both of these amendments would have clarified significantly the ambiguities
surrounding the question of violations of the humanitarian laws for non-international armed
conflicts in the case of Chechnya.
227 See. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL Pturrocol.s, supra note 166, at 1452 (absence of
specific rule protecting civilian status even when insurgents present should not be considered
license to attack).
223 See, e.g., Doswald-Beck, supra note 224, at 163.
229 See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3; Protocol II, supra note 13, arts. 13-15.
23° See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
231 See supra text accompanying note 204 (quoting Article 3's provisions).
252 See Protocol 11, supra note 13, art. 13(1).
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Common Article 3 and Protocol 11. 2" In addition to the initial bombing
campaigns, Russian forces continued to use artillery and rocket fire
even after they became aware of the consequent high civilian casualty
rate.234
 The Russian forces indiscriminate use of artillery—killing thou-
sands of civilians and destroying residential buildings, hospitals and
even an orphanage in the process—did not respect the right of Chech-
nya's civilian population to humane treatment under Common Article
3.235
 The collateral damage from these attacks also should violate the
general protections for the civilian population outlined in Protocol Il's
Article 13.2''' Although the facts remain unclear on the nature of actual
Russian tactics in Chechnya, one can also argue that the Russians' use
of extreme force in Grozny and its outskirts effectively constituted direct
attacks on the civilian population as a whole. 237 The evidence indicating
that Russians fired on civilians during their ground assault on Grozny
would thus seem to fall squarely within Protocol II's prohibition of
direct attacks. 2"
In sum, the evidence available supports the conclusion that the
conduct of both sides in the Chechen conflict violated the relevant
laws of war governing non-international armed conflicts. 28" Neither
Russian nor Chechen forces appear adequately to have respected their
obligations to treat the civilian population humanely under Protocol
II and Common Article 3. 24° Difficulties arise, however, when one
considers how the international legal order treats these "apparent"
violations of the laws of war. It is one thing to argue that international
legal standards such as Common Article 3 and Protocol II should apply
to a particular situation, but quite another to conclude that they will
apply. 24t
C. Autointerpretation and Implementing the
Laws of War in Internal Conflicts
As the previous discussions indicate, the authority to determine
whether the rules governing international or non-international armed
2" See supra notes 68-71, 83 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 78, 83 and accompanying text.
2" See supra note 70; see also Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3.
236 See Protocol 111, supra note 13, art. 13(1).
237 See id. art. 13(2).
238 See id.; Hiatt., supra note 78, at A26.
2" See, e.g., Human Rights Body Rebukes Both Sides, supra note 76.
241) See Protocol 11, supra note 13; Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3.
241 se.,, e.g., Rubin, supra note 124, at 495 (noting fairly low point at which legal argument.
becomes unconvincing to those who hold power tenuously).
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conflicts apply, as well as what interpretation the applicable rules
should receive, generally falls to states as the basic organs of interna-
tional law."' Without any overarching entity authorized to determine
both when the law applies and how to interpret the law's substantive
meaning, states retain independent authority to invoke and apply their
own views.'" The eminent international legal scholar, Leo Gross, in his
famous essay, States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of
Autointerpretation, further explained the role of states in this process:
The technical organizational insufficiency of international
law may, and in fact does, make it difficult to determine
whether a state acts in accordance with, or contrary to, inter-
national law . . . . It is generally recognized that the root of
the unsatisfactory situation in international law and relations
is the absence of an authority generally competent to declare
what the law is at any given time, how it applies to a given
situation or dispute, and what the appropriate sanction may
be. In the absence of such an authority, and failing agreement
. . . each state has a right to interpret the law, the right of
autointerpretation, as it might be called. 2"
Under this theory of autointerpretation, therefore, international
law permits states to offer and act upon their views of the law.'" A
state's view, however, remains just that—one interpretation of the
law, not a final decision on its applicability and content.'" Treaties
and other agreements for adjudication or arbitration, in contrast,
242 See supra notes 149-56 (discussing difficulties of recognition in determining whether a
conflict is international or non-international); see also supra notes 210-11, 227-28 (discussing
difficulties in determining appropriate interpretations of Common Article 3 and Protocol II). In
the modern context, states are no longer the sole organs of international law, other entities (e.g.,
the Security Council, the ICJ, etc.) possess the power to act as organs of the international legal
system. No international organization currently exists, however, with fUll authority to interpret
and apply the laws of war for international conflicts, let alone those internal in character.
243 See, e.g., RICHARD A. FALK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 12-13 (1971) (idea
of objective criteria for application of laws of war misleading; governments define their relation-
ship to insurgent faction largely in accordance with their political preference and, if necessary,
describe this preference in relation to appropriate legal status); Rubin, supra note 124, at 474
(discussing process of a state's political decisionmaking to determine legal relations).
244 LEo CROSS, States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation, in
LEO CROSS ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 386-87 (Martinus Nijhoff, ed.
1984) (1953). Cross directed this theory specifically at the issue of the jus ad helium and
international law; however, its underlying theory applies more broadly. See id. at 382-86.
245 See id. at 384.
246 Id, at 386. In this sense the theory of "autointerpretation" differs markedly from theories
of "autodecision" or "autoenforcement," which contend that states simultaneously make the law
and decide with finality the manner of its application. See id. at 380-81.
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can both establish procedures for settling competing interpretations
of international law and hold parties accountable for past viola-
tions.247 In such circumstances, states effectively consent to the re-
view of their interpretations of international law by a common
arbiter, one capable of issuing an authoritative determination of
what law applies and whether a violation has occurred in light of
specific circumstances."'
In the sphere of the laws of war, however, the theory of autointer-
pretation remains the operating norm. No provisions exist for an
authoritative resolution by a third party of competing claims on the
application, interpretation or violation of the laws relating to either
international or non-international conflicts."" With respect to the laws
of war for international armed conflicts, the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I do provide for minimal supervision of the law through the
concept of Protecting Powers or, alternatively, the services of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (the "ICRC"). 25° In practice,
however, states have rarely utilized the Protecting Power system, and
although the ICRC has played a more substantial role, it often has been
an extralegal one."
In terms of investigating violations, Protocol 1 provides for the
establishment of an International Fact-Finding Commission (the
"IFFC") to investigate breaches of the laws of war, but only in the case
of an international armed conflict. 252 In order to permit its estab-
lishment, moreover, a state must specifically accept the IFFC's compe-
tence by means of a unilateral declaration. 253 Once accepted, the IFFC
247 GROSS, supra note 244, at 392-93.
248 See id. at 392 (listing treaties where procedures exist for making binding determinations
of the law).
249 Forsythe, supra note 181, at 286.
250 See Geneva Conventions I—III, supra note 13, art. 8; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 13,
art. 9 (providing Convention shall he applied with the cooperation of Protecting Powers); see also
Geneva Conventions I-111, supra note 13, arts. 9-10; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 13, art.
10-11 (providing a role for the ICRC in addition to or in absence of a role for Protecting Powers);
Protocol I, ,supra note 13, art. 5 (providing contracting parties under legal duty to designate and
accept supervision of Protecting Power or ICRC). A Protecting Power is a state that formally
undertakes to protect the interests of a warring state's nationals during an ongoing international
conflict. See KAISHOVEN, supra note 12, at 62.
251 See. George 11 Aldrich, Compliance with the Law: Problems and Prospects, in EFFEcrrING
Comin.iiktice 1-13 (1993); see also KWAKWA, supra note 12, at 164-65; Rubin, ,supra note 129, at
486 (describing ICRC role). Since World War II, Protecting Powers have formally played a role
in only four instances: in the 1956 Suez crisis, in Goa in 1961, in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict,
and in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war. KWAKWA, supra note 12, at 164.
252 Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 90.
253 Id.; see alsoKm,sususiLN, supra note 12, at 131; KWAKWA, supra note 12, at 159-60, Although
Russia did submit such a declaration, given the previous conclusion that Chechnya does not
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mission remains one of investigation; it has no authority to judge the
guilt of the warring parties, nor can it release its findings unless all the
parties to the conflict request that the Commission do so. 254 In reality,
therefore, these organizations (i.e., Protecting Powers, ICRC, IFFC)
play only a nominal role in giving effect to the provisions in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol I that attempt to hold both individuals and
states responsible for violations of the rules for international armed
conflicts. 255 In any case, contracting states remain free to exercise their
right to autointerpretation by insisting that the conflict is non-interna-
tional in character, and thus these supervision mechanisms do not
app ly.256
With the interests of only one state formally involved, the right to
autointerpretation becomes even more significant in cases of non-in-
ternational armed conflicts.257 Given the internal nature of such
conflicts, other states and international organizations can play a role
only when the state concerned consents to their participation by ac-
cepting specified procedures in a particular treaty or on an ad hoc
basis. 258 Without a state's formal consent, however, the default rule
remains that other states and international organizations lack standing
to interfere in that state's internal affairs. 259
involve an international armed conflict, this declaration has limited utility with respect to inves-
tigating violations of the laws of war in that conflict.
251 KWAKWA, supra note 12, at 161.
25.5
	
Articles 51, 52, 131 and 148 of Geneva Conventions I—IV, respectively, contracting
parties agree that no party can absolve itself of any liability for breaches of the Conventions'
provisions. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13; KAISHOVEN, supra note 12, at 67. Protocol 1
further provides that a contracting party that violates its provisions or the Conventions shall be
held responsible and liable to pay compensation if the case demands. See supra note 13, art. 91.
Both the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I also define those grave breaches for which a state
has an obligation to search for and try the responsible individuals. See Geneva Conventions, supra
note 13, arts. 50, 51, 130, 147 of Geneva Conventions I-1V, respectively; Protocol I, supra note
13, art. 85; see also KALSHOVEN, supra note 12, at 68-69, 132-35.
256 See, e.g., supra note 243 and accompanying text (describing controlling view of states on
status of a conflict).
257 Although wars of national liberation also involve the interests of only a single state,
contracting states agree under Protocol 1 that such conflicts implicate the monitoring mecha-
nisms discussed supra notes 250-51 (e.g., Protecting Powers, ICRC, IFFC). See generally Protocol
I, supra note 13.
256 Thus, all members of the United Nations agree to accept a role for the United Nations
Security Council whenever it finds a situation that represents a threat to international peace and
security. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39-51 (Chapter VII). The Security Council therefore possesses
the authority to find that an internal conflict (e.g., Rwanda) rises to a level threatening interna-
tional peace and security and to take measures accordingly.
259 See, e.g., supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of standing in
international law).
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Nothing in Common Article 3 or Protocol II deviates from this
default rule.26" Both Common Article 3 and Protocol II leave to the
state involved in a non-international conflict the final interpretation
of questions relating to the laws' application, implementation and
violation. 26 ' Protocol II specifically prohibits other states from "inter-
vening, directly or indirectly, for any reason, whatever, in the armed
conflict, or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting
Party, in the territory of which that conflict occurs." 2"2 Unlike with
international conflicts, provisions do not exist in non-international
conflicts for introducing the oversight of a Protecting Power or impar-
tial humanitarian organization, nor for establishing issues related to
collective and individual responsibility. 2"3
 Thus, while a state undoubt-
edly accepts certain standards of conduct when it ratifies the Geneva
Conventions and their Protocols, it does not follow that the state also
agrees to accept an authority, aside from itself, capable of determining
how to apply, implement and enforce these standards. 2"
In light of all this, it becomes apparent that nothing in interna-
tional law currently restricts Russia's basic right of autointerpretation
with respect to events in Chechnya. Whatever the issue—whether it
involves Chechnya's status as a "Power," the meaning of the term
"humane treatment," or the finding of a violation of some rule—Rus-
sia's interpretation of the law will control unless some other authority
exists capable of ruling on the propriety of Russia's views. 215 In the
context of non-international armed conflicts, no such authority exists.
Neither Common Article 3 nor Protocol II provides any mechanisms
by which its standards could be implemented and enforced without
the consent of the Russian Federation.2"" Neither Chechnya, nor other
states, nor international organizations possess any standing under in-
26° See Protocol II, supra note 13; Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3.
261 See, e.g., Forsythe, supra note 181, at 294; see also Bart De Shutter & Christine Van De
Wyngaert, Coping with Non -International Armed Conflicts: The Borderline Between National and
International Law, 13 GA. J. & CotoP. L. 279, 284 (1983) (effectiveness of Article 3 limited
by the absence of precise guidelines for determining to which factual situations it applies).
262 Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 3(2).
265
 See Kea.stwEN, supra note 12, at 145.
264 See,	 Forsythe, supra note 181, at 294; GRoss, supra note 244, at 391-93 (discussing
right of autointerpretation and multilateral treaties).
26' See supra notes 149-56, 299-11 arid accompanying text (discussing difficulty in determin-
ing who constitutes a "Power" and what amounts to inhumane treatment).
266 Although Chechnya certainly has an interest in Russia's interpretations of the law, Chech-
nya does not possess the requisite status to act as an organ of international law. See supra note
150-52 and accompanying text. Conversely, although states and international organizations have
sufficient status to act as organs of international law, they lack the requisite legal interest to do
so in the case of Chechnya. See supra note 16.
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ternational law to question Russia's interpretations of the law and facts
in Chechnya.267 Common Article 3 and Protocol II may, therefore,
establish international law's interest in internal conflicts, but they do
not provide adequate, independent mechanisms to interpret that legal
interest. 268 This does not mean, however, that international law could
never govern events in Chechnya. In theory, Russia could always agree
by treaty or otherwise to a final review of the legality of its conduct in
Chechnya. As yet, however, it has chosen not to do 50.269
In sum, therefore, one can draw several conclusions from the
preceding analysis of international law and the Chechen conflict. First,
issues of recognition ultimately will determine the (non) international
character of an armed conflict. 27° Second, although a number of states
(including Russia) accept the relevance of international laws in non-
international armed conflicts, the standards agreed upon lack spe-
cificity. 271 As a result, equally reasonable arguments will often reach
opposite conclusions as to how international law applies in a specific
situation. Finally, the ambiguity of these laws is compounded by the
problem of autointerpretation, where a state's views of its non-interna-
tional conflict will control because no mechanisms exist independent
of that state to supervise the laws' implementation and enforcement. 272
Thus, although international law has provided positive laws gov-
erning the conduct of warring parties in non-international armed
conflicts, it has yet to establish positive law mechanisms to implement
and enforce these standards. Given these practical difficulties with
respect to the laws of war in non-international armed conflicts, it
becomes necessary to analyze alternative or supplementary methods
by which the international community can address internal conflicts
with international standards.
257 See supra note 16 (discussing need fiw standing before international tribunals).
25R See, e.g., G.1A.D. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Internal Armed Conflict, 13 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 253,276 (1983).
"'Whether Chechnya could agree or disagree to this review poses more interesting ques-
tions, given the question of its status tinder international law. See supra notes 149-56 and
accompanying text.
270 See supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 208-11,224-28 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
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III. AN
 ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE OSCE AND
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF POLITICAL AGREEMENTS IN
INTERNAL CONFLICTS
The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the
"OSCE"), currently composed of fifty-three member states, oversees
the implementation and continuing elaboration of the norms origi-
nally established by the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975. 273
 By
signing the Final Act, participating states accepted and pledged to
conform their actions to ten basic principles, including the concepts
of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers,
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 274 Partici-
pating states further committed themselves to a series of periodic
follow-up meetings designed both to review the implementation of
the Final Act's principles and to develop more specific standards of
2" See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1,1977,14 1.L.M.
1292 (1975), repn'nted in BLOED, supra note 95, at 43-100 [hereinafter "Final Act"]; Thomas
Buergenthal, The CSCE Rights System, 25 Geo. IA/Asti. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 333,344-45 (1991). As
far back as the 1950's the Soviet Union and the United States began to explore the idea of
developing a European conference to achieve progress on issues of security, economics and
human rights. See BLOED, supra note 95, at 1-2; Russell, supra note 95, at '244-45. After a series
of multilateral preparatory talks held in Helsinki from 1972-73, the participating states all agreed
to an agenda for the planned conference that sought to focus negotiations around four "baskets,"
or sets, of issues: (1) European security as elaborated through 10 guiding principles, (2) coop-
eration in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment, (3) cooperation in
humanitarian and other fields, and (4) a follow-up process for any concluded agreements. &mu),
supra note 95, at 3-6. Through the idea of "linkage," moreover, states agreed that progress in
any one basket required similar progress in the oilier three baskets. See id. at 9. Given its scope,
however, this Note will concentrate solely on the 10 basic principles guiding relations between
states outlined in the first basket on European security.
274 See Final Act, supra note 273, at 1293, reprinted in BI.OED, supra note 95, at 44-49
(participating states express not only common adherence to principles set out in Final Act, but
also their determination to respect and implement them in their mutual relations). The 10
principles can he summarized as follows:
1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force;
3. Inviolability of frontiers;
4. Territorial integrity of States;
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes;
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs;
7. Respect fir human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought,
conscience, religion or belief;
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
9. Cooperation among States;
10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.
Bwen, supra note 95, at 6. The Final Act recognized each principle's primary significance and
thus required that the interpretation of any one principle necessitated consideration of the
others. See Final Act, supra note 273, at. 1296, reprinted in BLOED, supra note 95, at 49.
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conduct. 2" Based on a consensus decision-making process, these meet-
ings evolved into forums where states engaged in extensive public
dialogue over the methods each had chosen to interpret and comply
with agreed-upon principles. 27" Eventually, these meetings became in-
stitutionalized into a standing organization, today's OSCE, with estab-
lished mechanisms for pursuing states' compliance with an emerging
body of norms. 277
A. The Nature of OSCE Norms—Distinguishing Political
and Legal Commitments
Unlike treaties such as the Geneva Conventions or their Protocols,
none of the principles or standards promulgated by the states partici-
pating in the OSCE involve an international legal obligation. 278 Inter-
national law requires that for a document to involve a "legal" commit-
ment, the parties to that document must intend it either to create legal
rights and obligations or to establish relations governed by interna-
tional law.2" In issuing the Helsinki Final Act, however, the participat-
27r' Known alternatively as the "Helsinki Process" or the "CSCE," each Follow-Up Meeting
(Belgrade 1977-78, Madrid 1980-83, Vienna 1986-89, Paris 1990, Helsinki 1992 and Budapest
1994) and Conference on the Human Dimension Meeting (e.g., Paris 1989, Copenhagen 1990
and Moscow 1991) made significant strides in placing human rights issues onto the East-West
political agenda. See, e.g., Mom, supra note 95, at 12-26 (listing accomplishments of Helsinki
Process up to Vienna Meeting) JOHN FRS', THE HELSINKI PROCESS (1993) (analyzing human rights
achievements of Helsinki Process in context of Cold War's demise); WILLIAM KOREY, THE PROM-
ISES WE KEEP (1993) (discussing achievements of Helsinki Process from American perspective);
Buergenthal, supra note 273, at 333-367 (detailing Helsinki Process achievements as creating a
system for protection of human rights).
276 See, e.g., Max W. Kampelman, The Helsinki Final Act Peace Through Diplomacy, 13 CA. J.
INT). & COMP. L. 327, 329 (1983). With each successive meeting, when asked to justify domestic
policies that violated other Final Act principles (e.g., respect for human rights or self-determina-
tion), states less frequently invoked the principle of non-intervention in a state's internal affairs.
See Russell, supra note 95, at 260. At the conclusion of the 1991 Moscow Conference on the
H1,11111111 Dimension, OSCE members "categorically and irrevocably declare[d] that the commit-
ments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE I i.e., OSCE] are matters of
direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the
internal affairs of the State concerned," Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:
Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, Oct. 3, 1991,
Preamble, 30 I.L.M. 1670, 1672 (1991) [hereinafter Moscow Document).
277 After the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, for example, CSCE participating states agreed
to establish a CSCE Council of Ministers and a Committee of Senior Officials as well as a
Secretariat to provide both new organs with administrative and operational support. See Buergen-
thal, supra note 273, at 363; see also Nils Eliasson, Institutional Development of the CSCE: A
Challenge of Change, 4 HELSINKI MoNrroR 12, 13 (1993) (detailing other organizations existing
under CSCE umbrella).
278 See, e.g., BLOED, supra note 95, at 11 (Helsinki documents do not have character of
treaties); Buergenthal, supra note 273, at 378 (CSCE documents 11(31 legally binding in form);
Russell, supra note 95, at 246 (Final Act morally compelling but not legally binding).
279 Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM.
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ing states clearly indicated that they did not intend that document to
be binding as a matter of international law. 28° The text of the Final Act
itself does not clearly state this intention, only because certain states
insisted such a clause would de-emphasize the document's otherwise
significant results. 28' In the end, the Final Act's only reference to its
own legal status provides that it "is not eligible for registration under
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations." 282
 A separate letter
sent by the Government of Finland to the United Nations clarified the
meaning of this clause by noting that the Final Act's ineligibility stood
in contrast to a "treaty" or "international agreement," both of which
were eligible for registration under Article 102. 2"
The Helsinki Final Act's nature, therefore, places it outside of
international law. 284
 Without evidence pointing to an intent to bind
states legally, the Final Act lacks a key characteristic found in treaties
and conventions. 285
 The Helsinki Final Act ultimately amounted, there-
fore, to a political document, with participating states making political
and moral, rather than legal, commitments to conform to its princi-
ples. 286
 OSCE Documents adopted subsequent to the Final Act have
maintained essentially the same political character. 287 In particular, the
terminology adopted in OSCE declarations, distinguishing OSCE
"commitments" from international law "obligations," will likely con-
INT'', L. 296, 296 (1977); see also Michael Bathe, Legal and Non-Legal Norms—A Meaningful
Distinction in International Relations, NETti. Y.B. INT'', L. 65, 67 (1982) ("An agreement binding
in law is created by the corresponding declarations of the parties expressing their consent to be
so bound."); Marian Nash, International Acts not.Constituting Agreements, 88 Am. J. INT' I. L. 515,
517 (1994) (quoting internal United States State Department Memorandum indicating parties
"must intend their undertakings to he legally binding" in order to constitute international
agreement). In drafting the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International
Law Commission defined a treaty as a document "governed by international law," excluding those
agreements 1) that were not intended to affect international legal rights and duties or 2) that
were governed by national laws. See P. van Dijk, The Final Act of Helsinki
—Basis fora Pan-European
System, NE'rn. Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 107 (1980),
280 See Bothe, supra note 279, at 73; van Dijk, supra note 279, at 106.
281 Russell, supra note 95, at 247 (citing Soviet, Swiss and Romanian objections to including
a clause on Final Act's non-legal character).
282 Final Act, supra note 273, reprinted in BLUED, supra note 95, at 100; see also Russell, supra
note 95, at 247, Schachter, supra note 279, at 296. Article 102 provides that "[e]very treaty and
every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the
present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and
published by it." U.N. CHARTER art. 102,1 1.
283
 Russell, supra note 95, at 248 (quoting text of letter); Schachter, supra note 279, at 296.
284 See, e.g., Human Rights: The Helsinki Process, 84 Am. SOCY 'NY!. & COMP. L. 113, 119
(1990) (remarks by Mala Tabory) (CSCE documents lie outside legal rule of pacta sunt servanda).
285 See id.
286
 Broom, supra note 95, at 11; Bothe, supra note 279, at 65.
287 Buergenthal, supra note 273, at 378.
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tinue to prevent OSCE standards from becoming legally binding at any
time in the near future.'"
The fact that OSCE documents lack a legal character, however,
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that OSCE principles and
standards are not binding.'" A commitment does not have to be legally
binding to have binding force.'" Legal rules are but one means by
which the international community may formulate shared expecta-
tions."' States remain equally free to enter into politically binding
agreements where each expects and relies upon compliance by the
other parties."' Indeed, a review of state practice shows the conclusion
of numerous non-legal, political agreements, the obligations of which
states have taken quite seriously."' Politically binding obligations, there-
fore, may contain a normative force that binds parties to act consis-
tently with agreed-upon principles or standards in a manner often
equivalent to that established by legally binding treaties or conven-
tions. 294
 In light of this, one can conclude that as politically binding
agreements solemnly entered into by the participating states, the dec-
larations of the OSCE possess a normative character."'
The primary distinction between legal obligations (e.g., treaties or
conventions) and political obligations (e.g., the Final Act or the more
recent OSCE Code of Conduct) rests on the legal consequences that
attach to the obligation. Where acts occur in conformity or breach of
international law, legal results may follow. 296 At the same time, however,
acts in conformity or breach of politically binding agreements also
create results, but only those political in nature. 291 This distinction
xsH Id.
289 BLOED, supra note 95, at 11.
290 van Dijk, supra note 279, at 110.
291 See Bothe, supra note 279, at 66.
292 See Schachter, supra note 279, at 299.
293 See, e.g., Bothe, supra note 279, at 65, 81-83 (citing non-legal agreements adopted in areas
of trade and monetary relations, including UNCTAD's Generalized System of Preferences); Nash,
supra note 279, at 515, 517-18 (citing non-legal nature of 1917 U.S.-Japan "Gentleman's Agree-
ment" on Japanese immigration, 1941 Atlantic Charter, 1978 Bonn Declaration and 1982 Shang-
hai Communique).
294 See van Dijk, supra note 279, at 118.
295 Buergenthal, supra note 273, at 381.
296 See Rubin, supra note 15, at 156-57.
297
 Thus, non-compliance with a non-legal obligation, such as an OSCE norm, does not give
rise to a cause of action before international legal bodies such as the ICJ or claims for reparations
as a matter of international law. See, e.g., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), 1978
I.CJ. 3, 39, 44 (ICJ declining to exercise jurisdiction when document on the basis of which
jurisdiction is claimed lacked legal character). Still, states retain expectations in political agree-
ments that parties will modify their practices in accordance with the relevant norms, and upon
the breach of those expectations, political responses can occur (e.g., economic sanctions, sever-
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means, therefore, that the instruments established by the OSCE to
implement and enforce its political norms can be regarded only as
political mechanisms; like OSCE documents and the norms they con-
tain, they have no legal character. 2'58
B. OSCE Norms and Processes as Applied to the
Armed Conflict in Chechnya
None of the original ten principles for relations between states
laid out in the Helsinki Final Act deals directly with normative rules
for the conduct of parties engaged in an armed conflict.•• The Hel-
sinki Final Act's guiding principles do contain several provisions on
the right to use force, including prohibitions against its use among
participating states.'" With respect to a state's treatment of its own
civilians, as in the case of an internal armed conflict, however, the Final
Act refers only to a participating state's obligation to respect human
rights and the right to self-determination."' The primary significance
of these references is to grant human rights the same status as more
traditional international principles such as territorial integrity and
non-intervention in a state's internal affairs."2
 As legitimate subjects of
ance of diplomatic relations, public criticism of breaching state, etc.). See Schachter, supra note
279, at 300, 303; van Dijk, supra note 279, at 115. The actual advantage of international law in
this respect lies in the fact that both legal and political enforcement mechanisms may be available
in the event of an international legal violation, while only political results may Follow a violation
of a politically binding norm. See Bothe, supra note 279, at 87.
298 See supra notes 284-87 (characterizing norms developed in Helsinki Process as non-legal
in nature). The recent OSCE Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration provides the only
exception to this rule by establishing a dispute resolution mechanism in which OSCE states may
participate by ratifying an optional treaty. See generally Gerard J. Tanja, Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes Within the CSCE: Bridge over Troubled Water, 4 HEI-SINKI MoNrrok 22 (1993).
299
 See Final Act, supra note 273, reprinted in BLOED, supra note 95, at 44-49.
5°°
 For example, Principle 2—Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force—refers to the
participating states' commitment to refrain "in their mutual relations, as well as in their interna-
tional relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State." Final Act, supra note 273, reprinted in 131.oim, supra note
95, at 45. Principle 6—Non-Intervention in Internal Affairs—also prohibits armed "intervention,
direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the
domestic jurisdiction of another participating State." Final Act, supra note 273, reprinted in BLOED,
supra note 95, at 47.
3° 1
 In the Final Act, participating states promised to "respect human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, fOr all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." Final Act, supra note 273, reprinted in Bum),
supra note 95, at 47. The participating states also reaffirmed their commitment to the principle
that all peoples always have the right to determine their internal and external political status
without external interference. See id. at 48.
592 See, e.g., Buergenthal, supra note 273, at 339-40 ("By linking human rights to peace and
840	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 36:793
international concern, moreover, the Final Act's human rights princi-
ples also become valid topics of inquiry for other participating states.' 103
Subsequent OSCE documents detailed and expanded upon the
general human rights norms laid out in the Final Act.'" With respect
to establishing standards of behavior for participating states engaged
in armed conflicts, the most important of these documents undoubt-
edly is the December 1994 "Code of Conduct on Politico-Military
Aspects of Security."'" This document does not introduce many new
substantive rules for states fighting in an armed conflict, but rather
incorporates all the obligations of international humanitarian law as
political commitments of OSCE participating states.'" OSCE political
norms, therefore, now embrace the relevant standards of conduct
found in international law, including the Geneva Conventions and
their 1977 Protocols. 307 Moreover, with respect to internal security
missions (i.e., internal armed conflicts), the Code of Conduct requires
states to accept additional obligations to use only that level of force
commensurate with their needs and to take due care to avoid injury
to civilians and their property.'"
The OSCE Code of Conduct's new regulations including the re-
quirement that states give due care to civilians in internal security
missions, do not, however, establish standards in any greater detail than
international law's Common Article 3 or Protocol II." The Code of
Conduct, like the international humanitarian law that it incorporates,
friendly relations, the participating states transformed human rights from a marginal item on the
pan-European political agenda into a subject of central importance to it.").
305 See Russell, supra note 95, at 260.
"See, e.g., Buergenthal, supra note 273, at 349-67 (detailing normative process of OSCE
Vienna, Copenhagen, Paris and Moscow meetings); see also Victor Y. Johnson, Recent Develop-
ments, International Human Rights—Helsinki Accords—Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe Adopts Copenhagen Document on Human Rights, 20 GA. J. & COMP. L. 645, 653-55
(1990) (describing human rights advances found in various OSCE documents, particularly the
Copenhagen Document on Human Rights).
905 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Budapest Document—Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era,
Dec. 6, 1994, at 21 [hereinafter "Code of Conduct"' (U.S. State Department copy on file with
author).
"See id. at 27, 28 ("[t]he provisions adopted in this Code of Conduct are politically
binding").
3"7 Id. at 27 (participating state shall ensure that its forces are "commanded, manned, trained
and equipped in ways that are consistent with the provisions of international law . . . related to
the use of armed forces in armed conflict including . . . Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
1977 Protocols additional thereto . . .").
" See id.
" See id.; see also Protocol II, supra note 13; Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3.
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lacks specificity." It merely delineates principles to which states should
adhere, rather than fixing clear-cut rules of conduct to which states
must adhere."" Nevertheless, the Code of Conduct remains significant
for establishing the existence of such politically binding OSCE norms,
which participating states should follow when engaged in internal
hostilities.'I 2
Furthermore, in addition to establishing norms relating to the
conduct of armed conflicts, the OSCE system also contains mecha-
nisms for the implementation and enforcement of these standards."I'l
Under the so-called Human Dimension Mechanism, a four-step com-
pulsory process permits states to inquire into other state's implemen-
tation and enforcement of OSCE commitments.'" First, any OSCE state
asked for information about its implementation processes must reply
to that request within ten days." Second, in the event that the state's
answer proves unsatisfactory, the inquiring state may convene a bilat-
eral meeting with the answering state on issues related only to the
initial inquiry. 316
 Third, should both of these attempts fail to satisfy the
inquiring state, it may inform all other states about its concerns.'"
Fourth, an issue that cannot be resolved through this process may be
specifically addressed at an annual meeting of the OSCE Conference
on the Human Dimension, a subcommittee of the OSCE dedicated to
implementing its human rights commitments." Finally, in the event
310 See Code of Conduct, supra note 305; see also Protocol 11, supra note 13; Geneva Conven-
dons, supra note 13, art. 3.
311 See generally Code of Conduct, supra note 305. Although under the Code of Conduct,
participating states accept obligations that "will ensure" the observance of certain conditions,
those conditions as listed are ambiguous enough to be susceptible to varying interpretations. See,
e.g., id. at 26 (participating state "will ensure that armed forces personnel vested with command
authority exercise it in accordance with relevant national as well as international law"); see also
id. at 27 (participating state "will ensure that its defense policy and doctrine are consistent with
international law related to the use of armed forces").
312 See id. at 28.
313 See, e.g., Buergenthal, supra note 273, at 369-75 (outlining OSCE institutional framework
to deal with states not observing OSCE commitments). The Code of Conduct explicitly recognizes
the applicability of such OSCE mechanisms to its principles. See Code of Conduct, supra note
305, at 28 (appropriate OSCE "bodies, mechanisms and procedures will be used to assess, review
and improve ... the implementation of this Code").
314 See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Concluding Document of die
Vienna Meeting, Jan. 17, 1989, 28 1.L.M. 531, reprinted in Bum), supra note 95, at 181, 213-14
[hereinafter Vienna Concluding Document]; see also BLOED, supra note 95, at '24; Buergenthal,
supra note 273, at 370-71.
315
 Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 314, reprinted in Bi.oitn, supra note 95, at 213.
315 Id.; Buergenihal, supra note 273, at 370.
317
 Buergenthal, supra note 273, at 370.
318 Id.
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of an emergency situation, the Senior Council—one of two operating
arms of the OSCE—may convene and take immediate action by con-
19sensus. 3
In addition to the Human Dimension Mechanism, a number of
other avenues remain available in the event of a dispute about a state's
compliance with its OSCE obligations. Given a consensus of participat-
ing states, acting through the Senior Council, the OSCE can send short
term rapporteur or expert missions to investigate a situation that may
violate OSCE norms. 320 The OSCE also possesses capabilities to under-
take longer missions or even peacekeeping operations to assist in
resolving or ending hostilities."' In cases of clear, gross and uncor-
rected violations of an OSCE commitment, moreover, other OSCE
states, under the so-called "consensus minus one" rule, can impose
sanctions on the offending state. 322
Perhaps the most useful mechanism of the OSCE, however, is also
its oldest. Under the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE docu-
ments, participating states have an obligation to respond, when asked,
to requests regarding their implementation (or lack thereof) of OSCE
commitments. 523 Termed the "mobilization of shame," this OSCE proc-
ess provides a public forum where participating states must openly
defend their interpretations of the scope and substantive meanings of
OSCE principles. 324 In areas where adjudication remains unlikely, this
process of dialogue and publicity provides a dynamic alternative. 325
A review of the OSCE's role in the Chechen conflict demonstrates
both the normative force of its agreements as well as the utility in
internal armed conflicts of its implementation mechanisms. Although
"2 See Rob Siekmann, The Linkage Between Peace and Security and Human Rights in the CSCE
Process, 5 HELSINKI MoNrrok 43,47-49 (1994); see also Code of Conduct, supra note 305, at 10
(changing name of Committee of Senior Officials to Senior Council).
320 See Heather Hulburt, CSCE Conflict Resolution in Practice, 5 HELSINKI MONITOR 25,26-34
(1994). In certain circumstances, the OSCE also anticipates sending missions without the inves-
tigated state's consent, although practical difficulties in placing personnel in such situations make
this provision generally unworkable. See, e.g., Doughty, supra note 96.
321 Hulburt, supra note 320, at 26-34; see also Siekmann, supra note 319, at 48-49. To date
OSCE has dispatched both long-and short-term missions to several areas in the former Yugoslavia,
Moldova, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia and most recently, Chechnya. See Wilhelm Hoynck, The Role
of the CSCE in the New European Security Environment, 5 HELSINKI MONITOR 16,20 (1994).
322 Siekmann, supra note 319, at 49.
323 See, e.g., Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 314, reprinted in BLOED, supra note
95, at 213; see also Russell, supra note 95, at 260.
944 Johnson, supra note 304, at 662.
323 The OSCE Code of Conduct affirmed this mechanism with respect to its own norms. See
Code of Conduct, supra note 305, at 28 ("Each participating State is responsible for the imple-
mentation of this Code. If requested, a participating State will provide appropriate clarification
regarding its implementation of the Code.").
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the Code of Conduct, like its legal counterparts, suffers from a number
of ambiguities, all the member states of the OSCE conceded its appli-
cability to the fighting in Chechnya." 6
 As part of the OSCE's manda-
tory process of discussion, even the Russian delegate eventually ac-
knowledged that, although Russia possessed a right to maintain its
territorial integrity, the manner in which it had done so in Chechnya
violated its citizens' human rights."' More importantly, OSCE mecha-
nisms also operated to cause Russia to permit several OSCE missions
to travel to Chechnya and to observe the conditions there." 2" The
Russian Federation even went so far as to permit a permanent OSCE
mission to Chechnya that could assist in restoring the rule of law as
well as monitor the extent to which the warring parties observe both
OSCE commitments and international humanitarian law." 2" As for the
missions' results, the first two delegations found that Russia's bombing
campaigns violated OSCE and international legal norms by causing a
massive loss of life within the civilian population.'" As a result of these
conclusions, moreover, Russia again found itself admitting that its
conduct in Chechnya violated its citizens' most basic tight to life."' In
the end, therefore, both the OSCE mission and the OSCE debates over
Russian and Chechen conduct provided a forum, if not for resolving
the dispute, then at least for providing the international community
with a role in what was universally acknowledged as an "internal mat-
ter."
IV. THE Two MODELS: LEGAL AND POLITICAL INTERNATIONAL
NORMS IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS
An examination of the two models discussed above reveals little
difference in scope or substance. In scope, both international law and
the OSCE Code of Conduct provide different standards of conduct
depending on whether conflicts occur between states or within a single
state."2
 In terms of non-international armed conflicts, the standards of
Common Article 3 and Protocol II for humane treatment and prohi-
bition against attacks on civilians differ little in substance from the
329 See supra note 104, and accompanying text, Indeed, OSCE states also agreed that violations
of international humanitarian law had occurred, but such statements lack legal force, given the
OSCE's entirely political nature. See id.
527 Id.
328 See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
329
 See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
330 See supra notes 109-10,112 and accompanying text,
331 See supra note 111 (quoting Russian Federation Justice Minister Kovalyov).
332 In fact, by incorporating international humanitarian law into the OSCE normative frame-
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OSCE Code of Conduct's requirements of due care and proportional-
ity."3 Each standard—one legal, the other political—establishes a
state's duty to avoid the indiscriminate use of force against its own
civilian population."4
Where international law's standards for armed conflicts and the
OSCE's politically binding "Code of Conduct" diverge, however, is in
the results that flow from an alleged violation. 355 Under the general
theory of autointerpretation, unless a state consents to submit its in-
terpretation of circumstances to a common arbiter, its view of the
legality or illegality of that situation will control. 336 This does not mean
that a state may determine as a matter of international law whether its
acts are per se legal because other states always remain free to agree or
disagree with the first state's views. 337 Rather, the theory of autointer-
pretation merely recognizes the possibility in many circumstances of
the absence of an agreed-upon, independent legal authority to adjudi-
cate, implement or enforce accepted legal principles.
Under international law, therefore, Russia can maintain that its
conduct in Chechnya remained consistent with its international legal
obligations without having to submit that claim to a legal process that
would test its validity. Neither Common Article 3 nor Protocol II (nor
the whole area of the laws of war, for that matter) provides, as a matter
of positive law, enforcement mechanisms to resolve disputed claims in
specific circumstances."' Thus, in Chechnya and other conflicts like it,
states alleging a violation of the laws governing internal armed
conflicts can do no more than make assertions, individually or collec-
tively, in the face of counter-assertions by the accused state(s). Regard-
ing Chechnya, for example,. Europe and the United States could de-
clare that Russia's conduct violated international law all they wanted,
work, the Code of Conduct establishes essentially the same principles of conduct as international
law for international armed conflicts. See supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
333 See supra notes 205, 214-25, 308 and accompanying text (describing standards under
Common Article 3, Protocol 11, and OSCE Code of Conduct).
959
	 II and the OSCE Code of Conduct expressly acknowledge this duty. See Protocol
II, supra note 13, art. 13(1); see also Code of Conduct, supra note 305, at 27. With respect to
Common Article 3, however, such a duty must be read into the meaning of the requirement of
"humane treatment." See Geneva Conventions, supra note 13, art. 3.
955 See supra notes 296-98 (discussing difference in results that flow from violation depending
on whether it involves legal or political norms).
33G
	 supra notes 243-48 and accompanying text. •
337 See supra note 246 (distinguishing theory of autointerpretation from theories of autode-
cision and autoenforcement).
33"
	 supra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
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but such assertions lack legal force—they did not overrule Russia's
initial counter-assertions, nor give rise to legal consequences.'"
The distinguishing characteristic of the OSCE framework, there-
fore, lies not in the nature of the norms to which participating states
agreed, but rather the process they utilize to implement and enforce
those norms. The OSCE provides above all a forum in which disputing
sides agree to air their dispute, even if the substantive basis of that
dispute is a political, rather than a legal, agreement. 34° In addition, the
OSCE also can send observer missions to troubled areas to oversee
directly the manner in which states implement or enforce their OSCE
commitments. The OSCE, thus, supplies both politically binding
norms and the political processes to implement them; international
law provides only legally binding norms, without any corresponding
legal enforcement mechanisms.34 ' Although the OSCE process admit-
tedly is often limited to mere debate, or relatively minor observer
missions, given the past treatment of "internal matters" in international
relations, the significance of these procedures should not be underes-
timated.342
 To date, states still remain incapable of agreeing on proce-
dures that will implement and enforce, as a matter of law, international
legal norms for international, let alone internal, armed conflicts.
This analysis of the OSCE should not, however, lead to the con-
clusion that its normative framework should be considered superior to
international law. The OSCE remains, after all, a political body, relying
on the political will of its members to enforce its commitments. Inter-
national law, on the other hand, if properly accompanied by legal
enforcement mechanisms, avoids this reliance on states' political will
because it implements, enforces and adjudicates norms as a matter of
law. The OSCE, therefore, stands not as competitor to international
law, but rather as a supplement to it. In the absence of legal mecha-
"9 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 69, at 12 (United States reminding Russia of its obligations
under the Geneva Conventions).
"'See supra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
541 See supra notes 265-69 (describing absence of implementation or enforcement mecha-
nism for international humanitarian law).
"2
 Richard Falk noted in this regard how:
[T]he need to explain, to justify, even if no adversary stronger than public opinion
was available, would tend to strengthen the position of more moderate pressures
within the principal governments . . . The greatest importance of international
institutions may be to provide tbrums within which adversary communication oc-
curs; standards of accommodation may gradually take shape, often by tacit adjust-
ment of behavior and objectives.
FALK, supra note 243, at 26.
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nisms to enforce the protections of international legal norms such as
Common Article 3 or Protocol II, the OSCE demonstrates the value of
utilizing politically binding norms through accepted political enforce-
ment processes to address intrastate conflicts."'
CONCLUSION
The conflict in Chechnya reveals the extent to which an organ
like the OSCE can serve as an effective, supplementary model for
addressing internal armed conflicts. By relying on the Russian Federa-
tion's political commitments under the Code of Conduct, OSCE par-
ticipating states effectively used the OSCE's public forum both to crack
the defense of non-intervention in internal affairs and to provide a
political role for the international community in addressing that
conflict. Without any agreements beyond the basic legal principles set
out in Common Article 3 and Protocol II, international humanitarian
law currently does not provide similar legal mechanisms for enforcing
Russia's international legal obligations. Ultimately, neither the OSCE
nor international law can bring an end to the suffering and horror of
war, but the OSCE does provide political mechanisms and a forum that
call states such as Russia to account for their actions. In the absence
of the political will to create binding and effective legal norms for the
conduct of internal warfare, the OSCE supplies an alternative method
by which politically binding agreements, accompanied by political en-
forcement procedures, provide a role for the international community
in constraining the conduct of parties to hellish, "internal matters,"
like Chechnya.
DUNCAN B. HOLLIS
543 Indeed, the OSCE Code of Conduct actually embraces international humanitarian law as
part of a participating state's politically binding commitments. See supra notes 306-07 and
accompanying text. The use of OSCE missions in Chechnya, moreover, actually led Russian
authorities to admit that its forces had violated not only OSCE principles, but also international
humanitarian law by using disproportionate and indiscriminate force against the civilian popu-
lation. See supra notes 104, 111 and accompanying text.
